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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores how farms and ranches can adapt to meet
consumer demand for outdoor activities like hunting, wildlife
viewing, hiking, or simply enjoying the solace of spending time in
rural places. These places hold breathtaking landscapes, but they are
often privately owned, relatively inaccessible to the general public,
and have not been managed to produce the ecosystem services' that
would support these activities, despite strong evidence of consumer
demand. 2 Historically, farms and ranches have been managed for a
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Parts
II and III of this Article are derived from an Article I previously published.
Anthony B. Schutz, Grassland Governance and Common-Interest Communities, 2
SUSTAINABILITY 2320-48 (2010), available at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-
1050/2/7/2320/pdf. Many thanks to the editors of the Fordham Environmental Law
Review for their assistance for inviting me to participate in the symposium. Thanks
as well to Eric Freyfogle, Steve Bradford, Steve Willbom, Tyler Sutton, John
Davidson, and the participants at venues where I've spoken about this subject,
including the University of Oregon School of law, Journal of Environmental Law
and Litigation, Agricultural Law Symposium, and the Norris Institute's New Era
Rural Energy Symposium. A speech I made on this topic for the Grasslands
Foundation, with the support of the University of Nebraska Center for Great Plains
Studies and the College of Law is available at
http://www.grasslandfoundation.org/work/events.html. Financial support from the
University of Nebraska College of Law and a McCollum Research Grant are
gratefully acknowledged.
1. For one of the most important works on ecosystem services see J.B. RUHL
ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007).
2. H. Ken Cordell, The Latest on Trends in Nature-Based Outdoor Recreation,
FOREST HISTORY TODAY, Spring 2008, at 4-10. Evidence of demand can be found
in the interests that lobby for various laws governing the use and protection of
natural resources. Such groups are comprised of people who care about these
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634 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW
single dominant use, undertaken wholly upon an individual's
landholdings. Entering the emerging market for nature-based
experiences requires that farms and ranches adapt from fragmented
single-use businesses to multi-functional enterprises that
cooperatively operate at larger spatial scales. This Article explains
how lawyers can help farmers and ranchers can make such a move.
I refer to the emergence of these enterprises as "nature-based
entrepreneurship." Nature-based entrepreneurship attempts to
capitalize on consumer demand for nature-based activities, while also
furthering the conservation movement on private lands. As a
consumer-oriented conservation approach, nature-based
entrepreneurship involves an embrace of market liberalism in pursuit
of environmental goals. And, as this Article explains below, it may
be one of the few feasible means of attaining environmental goals on
vast, privately owned rural landscapes.
This Article has three parts. Part I draws this Article within the
scope of this symposium by exploring a number of links between
nature-based entrepreneurship and the local-food movement. Part II
focuses on the Northern Great PlainS3 as an example of the problems
resources-people who are likely willing to pay to enjoy them. More direct
evidence exists in the amount of money people spend to travel to public lands to
have similar experiences. For an account of rural landscapes as depicted in judicial
opinions, see Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REv. 159, 212-28 (2006).
See generally FISH & WILDLIFE SERv. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, and U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING,
HUNTING, AND WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION (2006),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/fhw06-nat.pdf. Even conservation research
and education centers produce substantial economic benefits from consumers
taking part in their activities, as Edwards and Thompson have recently found.
Richard Edwards & Eric Thompson, The Role of Conservation Research and
Education Centers in Growing Nature-Based Tourism, 20 GREAT PLAINS RES. 51
(2010). Leases for hunting access are also evidence of consumer demand in areas
of the Midwest. BRUCE JOHNSON ET AL., DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECON., UNIV. OF NEB.,
REPORT NO. 185, NEBRASKA FARM REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS 2007-2008 19
(2008), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article
-1001 &context-agecon farmrealestate.
3. Ranchers on the Northern Great Plains are not alone in this effort. There is
a growing body of literature collecting examples from around the globe. See Almira
Hoogesteijn & Rafael Hoogesteijn, Cattle Ranching and Biodiversity Conservation
as Allies in South America's Flooded Savannas, 20 GREAT PLAINS RES. 37 (2010);
Rafael Hoogesteijn & Colin A. Chapman, Large Ranches as Conservation Tools in
the Venezuelan Llanos, 31 ORYx 274 (1999); Jeff Langholz, Global Trends in
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nature-based entrepreneurship faces and explores the legal tools
available to help producers overcome those problems. Finally, Part
III proposes a number of legal reforms that would help establish a
vibrant nature-based economy on rural lands in the Northern Great
Plains and, perhaps, elsewhere.
In the end, this Article demonstrates that producers have the legal
tools available to produce much more than food, and they would do
well to realize that opportunity. The Northern Great Plains is one
example of where such an opportunity exists, and its lessons can be
deployed elsewhere in furtherance of a more multi-functional rural
landscape.
I. LINKING LOCAL FOOD AND NATURE-BASED ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The articles collected in this issue focus on the legal tools that may
encourage food production closer to consumers-local food. The
legal tools generally used to implement a local food policy consist of
public law approaches, including the use of agricultural law, land use
regulation, environmental law, and international trade law.4 Those
tools are explored in many of the articles in this issue.
This Article diverges from this common theme in two ways. First,
it is only moderately concerned with public-law reform, focusing
instead on private law. Private law must not be forgotten as a tool
that creative lawyers can use to help producers achieve their goals.
Whether that goal is food production or something else, drastic
Private Protected Areas and Their Implications for the Northern Great Plains, 20
GREAT PLAINS RES. 9 (2010); Jeff Langholz et al., Incentives for Biological
Conservation: Costa Rica's Private Wildlife Refuge Program, 14 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1735 (2000); Glyn Maude & Richard P. Reading, The Role ofEcotourism
in Biodiversity and Grassland Conservation in Botswana, 20 GREAT PLAINS RES.
109 (2010); Nils Odendaal & Danica Shaw, Conservation and Economic Lessons
Learnedfrom Managing the Namibrand Nature Reserve, 20 GREAT PLAINS RES. 29
(2010); Siva R. Sundaresan & Corinna Riginos, Lessons Learned from Biodiversity
Conservation in the Private Lands of Laikipia, Kenya, 20 GREAT PLAINS RES. 17
(2010); Byron Swift et al., Private Lands Conservation in Latin America: The Need
for Enhanced Legal Tools and Incentives, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 85 (2004). I
intend to examine this literature, and a collection of legal documents from
enterprises in Namibia, in a future article.
4. For an overview of the local food movement, see Marne Coit, Jumping on
the Next Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the Local
Food Movement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 45 (2008).
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changes in public policy are not always necessary. This Article
explores one example of private-law creativity that may enhance the
local-food movement.
Second, and more fundamentally, this Article is not primarily
concerned with food production, let alone whether it occurs close to
consumers. Rather, it focuses on a broader vision of agricultural
production-the production of those ecosystem services that can
serve as the basis for nature-based enterprises.
Despite this divergence, there are at least three links between the
local-food movement and nature-based entrepreneurship. The first
link lies in the concept of "local." As others have argued,
improvements to "land health"'5 are more likely to occur upon the
emergence of local communitarian thinking and action.6 One
necessary component to making a community-based effort at
improving our natural environment is the ability of people in a
particular place to find something that draws them together as a
community.7 The most common example of people coming together
as a community and making improvements to land health is the
watershed.8  Impaired rivers and streams tie people together in
pursuit of a common purpose, effectively creating a community.
5.
Overall, land health can be defined scientifically as nature's ability to keep
doing what it has long done--building and retaining soil, clothing the land
with lush vegetation, cleansing water flows, capturing sunlight and
moving energy through multiple trophic levels, pulling minerals from the
subsoil and cycling them through predation chains, and ultimately, giving
rise to new life-forms able to find or create suitable niches. . . . [It] looks
far beyond the well-being of humans: Other species live on the land, and if
the land as a whole is valuable, they, too, are valuable. Health, moreover
is both a natural matter and a mysterious process, something understood
through collection of empirical data but also grasped in part through
intuition, sentiment, and other ways of making sense of the unknown. In
short, land health encompasses the kind of durable, flourishing, self-
recreating communal life that is the mark of a lasting link between people
and place.
ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS 48-51 (1998).
6. Id. at 123-25, 174-75.
7. Id. at 123-25, 162-63. By "community" I refer to a group of people
interacting with one another in pursuit of a common purpose in a particular place.
See id. at 123-27 (describing place-based communities and their benefits).
8. Id. at 162-63.
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Another catalyst for community identification may be the
"foodshed." 9 As consumers and producers begin to interact with one
another at a local foodshed level, community may develop.10
Farmers' markets are one place where people may come together.
And as producers confront the difficult production and distribution
problems they are likely to encounter, cooperation may emerge as a
necessary component of a successful foodshed economy. Such
cooperation could foster a sense of community.
As that local community develops, it may create the possibility of
using rural lands in more multi-functional ways, perhaps even
bringing a concern for land health to the forefront of this expanded
agriculture.11  Community is critically important to nature-based
entrepreneurship because, as this Article explains below, landowner
9. Coit explains the term "foodshed" as completely as anyone:
"The intrinsic appeal the term had and continues to have for us derives in
part from its relationship to the rich and well-established concept of the
watershed. How better to grasp the shape and the unity of something as
complex as a food system than to graphically imagine the flow of food
into a particular place? Moreover, the replacement of 'water' with 'food'
does something very important: it connects the cultural ('food') to the
natural ('...shed'). The term 'foodshed' thus becomes a unifying and
organizing metaphor for conceptual development that starts from a
premise of the unity of place and people, of nature and society."
Coit, supra note 4, at 46 n.4 (quoting Jack Kloppenburg et al., Coming in to the
Foodshed, 13 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 33 (1996), available at
http://www.cias.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 2008/07/comingin.pdf).
10. This is true, not only as between producer and consumer, but also among
producers and among consumers. Producer groups are, of course, a staple in
agricultural law and policy. The National Farm Bureau Federation, the National
Farmers Union, the Center for Rural Affairs, and many more ranging from local to
state to national levels exist as evidence of this trend. The local-food movement
can be expected to work within these, or within its own producer associations. In
fact, one major component of local food is a distribution network, which will draw
producers together. Buy Fresh Buy Local is one such example. See Buy Fresh Buy
Local Chapters, FOODROUTES.ORG, http://www.foodroutes.org/bfbl-chapters.jsp
(last visited June 30, 2011) (listing BFBL chapters in 22 states, including a number
of more local chapters).
11. Interestingly, this sort of community catalyst is driven in large part by
conscientious consumers. It thus signals a partial embrace of market liberalism.
There are, however, some who believe communities are likely to form only upon a
rejection of the individualistic tendencies libertarianism fosters. FREYFOGLE, supra
note 5, at 70-74. I partially disagree. Conscientious consumers who demand
something that can only be produced through cooperation can foster community.
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cooperation is a necessary component in creating the resources upon
which these businesses would be built. A concern for land health
may, in turn, enhance producers' desire to pursue nature-based
businesses. And as consumers within the local-food community
develop a concern for land health, they may also demand more
nature-based experiences.. 12
To realize this possibility and capitalize on the communities that
may emerge through the local-food movement, we should take stock
of the legal tools that could facilitate such a transformation. While
public law and regulation is often one means for communities to
implement their preferences, private law is an important tool for local
communities that are not easily bounded by a close-fitting political
boundary. This Article explores that subject.
The second link between local food and nature-based
entrepreneurship is the prospect of rural development. The local-food
movement often draws upon the prospect of rural development as a
policy justification.' 3 Nature-based entrepreneurship is also strongly
aligned with a rural-development policy.14  Rural-development
proponents have often touted agri-tourism, eco-tourism, or simply
tourism as a piece in the puzzle of maintaining a vibrant rural
economy.' 5 They have experienced difficulties,16 but given rural
12. The environmentalist egg, of course, may precede the local-food chicken.
That is, if communities emerge in pursuit of nature-based entrepreneurship
(communities that are driven by the need to create resources collectively), then
local-food production may follow. Thus, while the local-food movement may
contribute to community identification and nature-based entrepreneurship, nature-
based entrepreneurship may also facilitate the development of local-food producers
and, perhaps, nature-based farmers. Indeed, nature-based entrepreneurs may create
local food in the form of wild game, naturally raised livestock, and native fare.
13. Neil D. Hamilton, Emerging Issues of 21st Century Agricultural Law and
Rural Practice, 12 DRAKE J. OF AGRIC. L. 79, 84, 89-90 (2007). Rural development
is also growing concern abroad as countries become more urbanized. For a
compelling analysis of what countries should strive for in rural development, see
Lisa R. Pruitt, Human Rights and Development for India's Rural Remnant: A
Capabilities-Based Assessment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 (2011).
14. See id at 89; Neil D. Hamilton, Rural Lands and Rural Livelihoods: Using
Land and Natural Resources to Revitalize Rural America, 13 DRAKE J. OF AGRIC.
L. 179, 194 (2008).
15. USDA, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LIBRARY, RURAL INFORMATION
CENTER, Promoting Tourism in Rurual America, http://www.nal.usda.gov/
ric/ricpubs/tourism.html (last visited June 28, 2011); AGRIC. MKG. RES. CTR.,
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population loss, fluctuating income, and the absence of opportunities
for adult family members to stay home or return home,17 the general
desire to maintain business as usual may fade in favor of these
emerging income opportunities.' 8
Together, a vibrant local-food economy and strong nature-based
entrepreneurs could therefore enhance the economic climate of rural
areas, support farm and ranch families, and draw together
communities on rural landscapes, while improving those landscapes'
environmental performance. In short, the combination could improve
the economic, social, and environmental fabric of rural lands.
The third link has to do with the many ways in which nature-based
entrepreneurship could improve the local-food movement. One can
legitimately question the extent to which we should encourage food
production, even local-food production, as a dominant land use.
Indeed, critics of "industrial" agriculture often cite the vast
Agritourism, http://www.agmrc.org/commoditiesproducts/agritourism (last
visited Jun. 28, 2011).
16. Sometimes producers do not embrace this notion of rural development
because they view themselves as food, fiber, and fuel producers. They may not feel
that they and their ancestors endured a great many difficulties-settling the
American West, the Dust Bowl, cyclical farm crises, and many other personal
hardships-to provide a tourist experience. For a telling tale of life on one part of
the Great Plains, see generally TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO SURVIVED THE GREAT AMERICAN DUST BOWL
(2006). Given that history, many may hold firm to a perceived higher calling:
feeding the world. Placing environmentalism on par with food is no easy task, but
there is a strong thread of it in agrarianism. The two notions need not be at odds.
17. The importance of farms and ranches as homes deserves more attention than
I can give it here. Throughout the farm crisis of the 1980s, for instance,
tremendous attention was paid to saving the family farm. The normative case for
the effort is questionable if one focuses on macro-level economic concerns about
agricultural production and structural change. But the connection between
producers and their lands is something more than the use of commercial real estate.
One vision of the connection is in the concept of home. See FREYFOGLE, supra note
5, at 114-30. Wendell Berry, whom Freyfogle writes about extensively, is also a
prolific scholar on this subject. See, e.g., WENDELL BERRY, BRINGING IT TO THE
TABLE: ON FARMING AND FOOD 153 (2009) ("Elmer Lapp is eminently a traditional
farmer in the sense that his farm is his home, his life, and his way of life--not just
his 'work place' or his 'job.' "); id. at 31-36 (defining and defending the "family
farm").
18. CURTIS FREESE ET AL., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE
PRAIRIE ECONOMY: CONNECTING CONSERVATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS 31 (2009).
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landscapes devoted to production agriculture as a reason for a more
local foodshed production model.19 However, little attention has
been paid to the problems a myopic view of local agriculture might
cause. It is here, of course, that things like "natural systems
agriculture,"20 organic production, and sustainable agriculture come
into play. And the local-food movement, at times, embraces them. 2 1
But the local-food movement will not necessarily require those sorts
of production systems if it focuses solely on production (even
diversified production) and geography. To avoid this problem,
singular views of how land should be used ought to be displaced by
more holistic views of what a landscape produces and how it
produces it. Food is, of course, one important thing we get from a
landscape (and we can produce it in many ways), but there are other
important products.22 Nature-based entrepreneurship may encourage
their production within the local foodshed, perhaps dovetailing nicely
with the adoption of natural-systems agriculture. 23  Eclipsing that
prospect in favor of a local-food policy would expose the movement
to many of the criticisms that can be leveled at our existing
production system.
One of those key criticisms is the environmental impact of food
production. Agriculture is not environmentally benign, and stemming
the adverse environmental consequences of agriculture on privately
owned lands has been a huge challenge for environmentalists.24 The
sheer scale of the United States' privately owned landscape makes
19. See Coit, supra note 4, at 55.
20. Wes Jackson, Farming in Nature's Image: Natural Systems Agriculture, in
THE FATAL HARVEST READER: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE 65
(Andrew Kimbrell ed., 1999).
21. See Coit, supra note 4, at 51-55 (providing a description of local-food
environmental impacts, with primary emphasis on energy consumption, but not
production methods). For an author who includes both biodiversity concerns and
local-food consumption, see Catherine Badgley, Can Agriculture and Biodiversity
Coexist, in THE FATAL HARVEST READER, supra note 20, at 199, 206.
22. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 93-94.
23. See Joan Iverson Nassaer, Agricultural Systems in Harmony with Nature, in
THE FATAL HARVEST READER, supra note 20 at 49, 57 ("The new agricultural
landscape will be beautiful in a way that invites tourism. Scenic Roads and byways
and places for visitors to stay will become more appealing as parts of the
countryside that have lost habitat, streams, or a varied landscape pattern regain a
more recognizable image of nature.").
24. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
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regulatory approaches difficult. 25 This same scale makes these
privately owned lands tremendously important from a conservation
perspective.26 Given this importance and the difficulties associated
with environmental regulation at this vast scale, encouraging land
uses that generate income may be a better tack. In fact, it was
precisely this tack that our first, and all subsequent farm bills have
taken with commodity production. Nature-based entrepreneurship
may thus help deal with the environmentalist objection to local food
by ensuring that local-food production does not displace the
environmental value of landscapes.
The final aspect of nature-based entrepreneurship that could make
the local-food movement better is its utility as a risk-management
27
strategy. Food producers experience a great deal of risk. Price risk
and production risks (including pests, weather, and disease) combine
to create a high level of revenue uncertainty for producers, especially
producers with small financial reserves.28 The field of agricultural
law devotes considerable attention to the legal aspects of managing
25. See id. at 329-30. There are 922,095,840 acres of land in farms in the
United States, distributed among 2,204,792 farms. 44.1% of that is cropland, 8.1%
is woodland, 44.3% is pasture, and 3.4% is occupied by things like buildings,
farmsteads, livestock facilities, and ponds. USDA, 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE
16, tbl. 8 (2009). Compare those figures to the sixty million acres of urban land
uses in the United States. USDA, MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES,
2002 2 fig. 1 (2006), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EIB14/eibl4.pdf.
26. As Morrisette explains,.
There are few intact ecosystems today that exist solely on public lands.
And yet, in some cases there are still remarkably intact ecosystems that
exist almost exclusively on private lands. One-quarter of all ecosystem
types are inadequately represented on federal lands, and seven percent are
not found on federal lands at all. Most of the wetlands in the contiguous
United States are privately owned. Approximately half of all threatened
and endangered species in the United States are found exclusively on
private lands, and 20 percent of the remainder spends half of their time on
private lands.
Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the
Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 374 (2001).
27. For a discussion of these risks generally, see USDA, 2007 FARM BILL
THEME PAPERS: RISK MANAGEMENT (2006), http://www.usda.gov/documents/
Farmbill07riskmgmtrev.pdf For an introduction into the many legal issues relevant
to agriculture, including a concern for sustainability, see SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER,
FOOD, FARMING, AND SUSTAINABILITY (2011).
28. See id. at 2-3. The typical reference is to "small farms", but it is quite
difficult to figure out what makes a farm "small."
2011] 641
642 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW
these risks. Price risks are, for instance, passed to other economic
actors through forward contracts and futures contracts, including their
derivatives. 29 Production risk is managed through things like crop
insurance and the farm bill's commodity title. 30  Income
diversification is also a risk-management technique.3 Off-farm
employment is one form of income diversification, but there are on-
farm opportunities available, like marketing nature-based experiences
to consumers.32 The local-food producers of tomorrow may therefore
be well-advised to think about producing something in addition to
food as a diversification strategy. This Article charts one way of
helping producers to do just that.33
II. CONSIDERING NATURE-BASED ENTREPRENEURSHIP ON THE
NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS
The Northern Great Plains is an example of a place where nature-
based entrepreneurship may achieve environmental and rural-
29. See id at 3.
30. See id at 4-6.
31. See id. at 2-4.
32. Clearly, the best diversification opportunities are counter-cyclical. I do not
have the data to claim that nature-based businesses perform well when commodity-
based farm revenue is low. But if they do, then nature-based entrepreneurship
would obviously be a good diversification strategy. Even if they do not, income
diversification can help guard against more individual risks such as adverse
weather conditions or isolate crop failures.
33. There is a fourth link between the expanded form of production addressed
here and the local-food movement. If the local-food movement reduces the
demand for food currently being met by production in more distant locations, then
there might be an opportunity to use those more distant lands differently. Nature-
based entrepreneurship could emerge as an alternative or complimentary land use.
Making this link is difficult for two primary reasons. First, to the extent nature-
based business competes with more traditional forms of production, competition for
land may be with land uses like fiber and fuel production. Reducing food
production pressure would have little effect on that competition. Second, given the
global agricultural market-place and the forecasts concerning global food demand,
building more production at local levels domestically may not free resources for
alternative use in more distant locations in the United States. In other words,
demand may outpace any increased supply. To further complicate matters on the
supply side, international efforts at increasing production (local or not) and fair
weather in productive places can have a significant impact on supply. So it is far
too simplistic to suggest that the emergence of local food will open doors for
nature-based entrepreneurship as a function of a more bountiful food harvest.
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development goals, complementing its long history of food
production. Section A describes the Northern Great Plains and its
environmental relevance. Section B explains the problems facing
nature-based entrepreneurs. Section C discusses the legal tools that
can help producers overcome these problems.
A. The Northern Great Plains
The Northern Great Plains includes parts of Nebraska, South
Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming and Montana in the United States
and parts of the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta,
spanning approximately 178,657,000 acres. 34 Twenty-four percent of
the land is publicly owned, but less than two percent of it is managed
primarily for biodiversity conservation.3 5 The remaining seventy-six
percent of it is privately owned, and sixty-four percent of that land is
devoted to livestock grazing.36
The World Wildlife Fund has designated the Northern Great Plains
as a "Global 200 ecoregion-one of the 238 most biologically
significant places on Earth."37 It is one of the few areas in the world
where a grassland ecosystem exists at a large scale, and much of the
grazing land is in its native or semi-native habitat. Most of the native
grassland consists of mixed-grass or shortgrass prairie. 38
Prairie is a particularly interesting landscape that is sometimes
overlooked as an appealing destination. Indeed, in the United States,
it lies in the shadow (figuratively and literally) of the great
mountainous west, and it doesn't often draw the attention of those
looking for the water-based landscapes of the Great Lakes region to
its east. But it is spectacular upon closer examination.
34. Curtis Freese et al., Proposed Standards and Guidelines for Private Nature
Reserves in the Northern Great Plains, 20 GREAT PLAINS RES. 71, 71-84 (2010).
35. Idat 71.
3 6. Id.
37. STEVE FORREST ET AL., N. PLAINS CONSERVATION NETWORK, OCEAN OF
GRASS: A CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT FOR THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS 4
(2004), available at http://www.npcn.net/documents/npcn%20ca%2011 mar04.pdf.
38. Richard Edwards & Richard P. Reading, Saving the World's Grasslands: An
Introduction, 20 GREAT PLAINS RES. 5, 5-7 (2010), ("While estimates differ, it
appears that in the northern Great Plains only about 1% to 3% of the original
tallgrass prairie remains intact, perhaps 20% to 30% of the mixed-grass prairie, and
40% to 70% of the shortgrass prairie.").
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Prairie is one of the most subtle and complex of
ecosystems, and to those who have taken the time to get to
know it, there is nothing comparable. What to the untrained
eye may seem to be a simple monoculture is in fact one of
our most diverse sources of plant, soil, insect and animal
life.39
The need for prairie conservation is pressing. Its privately owned
grasslands are being converted to cropland at an increasing pace due
to high commodity prices (attributable to a variety of factors like
biofuels policy) 40 and government programs that support traditional
agricultural production.41 Grazing lands are also problematic.
39. John H. Davidson, North America's Great Carbon Ocean: Protecting
Prairie Grasslands Keeps Carbon in the Soil and Slows the Pace of Climate
Change, 29 SAVING LAND 19 (2009), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/
about/saving-land/winter-201 0/carbon-ocean.pdf.
40. Id.
41. FORREST, supra note 37, at 53. Programs that clearly encourage agricultural
production are those that remain tied to actual production, like average crop
revenue election payments, marketing assistance loans, loan deficiency payments,
crop insurance, and supplemental disaster assistance. See 7 U.S.C. § 8715 (Supp.
IV 2010) (average crop revenue election program); 7 U.S.C. § 8731 (Supp. IV
2010) (nonrecourse marketing assistance loans); 7 U.S.C. §8735 (Supp. IV 2010)
(loan deficiency payments); 7 U.S.C. §§1501-24 (Supp. IV 2010) (crop insurance);
7 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2010) (supplemental disaster assistance). Direct
payments and counter-cyclical payments are divorced from actual production for
the most part, with those payments tied to "base acres"--acres with a history of
production. See 7 U.S.C. § 7911 (Supp. IV 2010) (establishment of base acres); 7
U.S.C. § 8702(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (defining base acres); 7 U.S.C. § 8711 (Supp. IV
2010) (adjustments to base acres); 7 U.S.C. § 8713 (Supp. IV 2010) (availability of
direct payments); 7 U.S.C. § 8714 (Supp. IV 2010) (availability of counter-cyclical
payments). But see 7 U.S.C. § 8717 (Supp. IV 2010) (prohibiting the production of
fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on base acres, subject to a variety of exceptions and
pilot programs). Those payments do not encourage conversion in the same way,
absent the possibility that the production on new lands can someday qualify for
"base acre" treatment. There is, of course, that possibility.
The only farm-bill efforts at reducing the conversion incentive provided by
commodity-based subsidies are found in "swampbuster," "sodbuster," and the
"sod-saver" provisions of the Farm Bill. Swampbuster has been the most
significant limitation, aided in part by Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. See
generally Stewart L. Hofer, Comment, Federal Regulation of Agricultural
Drainage Activity in Prairie Potholes: The Effect of Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act and the Swampbuster Provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill, 33 S.D. L. REV. 511
(1988). Sodbuster is concerned only with soil erosion losses from highly erodible
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Traditional grazing practices are not suited to maintaining a habitat
for many grassland bird species, and grazing in riparian areas results
in degradation.42 In addition, cattle producers often eliminate native
grazers like prairie dogs, states cap the population of species like elk
through hunting regulations geared at protecting grazing land, and
large carnivores are largely missing from the landscape. 43 In essence,
wildlife on these working landscapes is eliminated or managed as a
pest to be reluctantly tolerated. It is not often viewed as a valuable
resource.
Despite all of this, those who own and occupy the landscape often
tout themselves as the best stewards, decrying environmentalists as
meddlers.4 Their stewardship claim is not unfounded. Farmers and
ranchers have a deep love for the landscape they have toiled on and
against for so many generations; they rely upon biological processes
for their livelihoods; and almost all maintain a concern for future
generations-a concern typically voiced as a desire to pass the lands
to their children and grandchildren. Importantly, these people also
know a great deal about their property, including its vegetation and
wildlife.45
lands and, thus, does not provide much protection for native prairie. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 3812(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing for an exception to sodbuster ineligibility
so long as the producers is following a conservation plan geared at soil loss); 16
U.S.C. § 3812(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing for the development and
implementation of conservation plans under sodbuster). Finally, Sodsaver places
nearly no restrictions on conversion. See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(o) (Supp. IV 2010)
(providing for a five year restriction for crop insurance on lands converted from
"native sod", but requiring that states in the Prairie Pothole National Priority Area
opt-in through a gubernatorial election).
42. FORREST, supra note 37, at 57-58.
43. Id.
44. See J.B. Ruhl, Farmland Stewardship: Can Ecosystems Stand Any More of
It?, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 2-3 (2002).
45. 1 make these observations from years of personal experience with my family
and the rural community I grew up in. For a summary of findings from rural
sociologists, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and
Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and
Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 437-44. Evidence can be
found in the popular media as well. See, e.g., Ellen Campbell, Selling the Family
Farm, THE FENCE POST (Mar. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.thefencepost.com/article/20110319/NEWS/ 110319924.
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But producers are unlikely to produce many of the ecosystem
services that we need for a healthy and prosperous future.46 Non-
point source pollution and nutrient loading in our nation's waterways
is but one example of environmental damage that undercuts
producers' stewardship claim,47 and biodiversity loss is another.48
These sorts of problems reveal at least one significant limitation to
the landowner-as-steward principle: producers' management choices
respect nature to the extent it makes economic sense on their
properties and does not harm their neighbors who are engaging in the
same pursuits. 49  Clearly, the biological processes from which
46. Indeed, if we are entitled to those goods and services, these stewards are not
merely reluctant providers; they are causing a great deal of harm. Ruhl, Farmland
Stewardship: Can Ecosystems Stand Any More of It?, supra note 44, at 11-13;
Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, supra note 24,
at 274-92; J.B. Ruhl, Three Questions for Agriculture About the Environment, 17 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 400-01 (2002).
47. Doug Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water
Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 21, 44-49 (2002).
48. See Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,
supra note 24, at 274-77. Ruhl includes a long list of environmental harms,
including habitat loss and degredation, soil erosion and sedimentation, water
resources depletion, soil and water salinization, agrochemical releases, animal
waste, nonpoint source water pollution, and air pollution.
49. I do not think producers should be asked to turn away from economic
returns in favor of environmental altruism. Wendell Berry agrees: "I would not
endorse any more wilderness preservation projects that do not seek also to improve
the health of the surrounding economic landscapes and human communities ....
The dualism of domestic and wild is, after all, mostly false, and it is misleading."
BERRY, supra note 17, at 68. At the same time, economic liberalism does not
necessarily mean the rejection of communitarian thought. See FREYFOGLE, supra
note 5, at 72 ("In its original form, liberalism sought not only to promote the
individual as such but also to vest individuals with the power to join with others to
pursue shared aims."). My point here is simply that the markets producers
currently serve (and the biological processes they currently use) do not foster
community in a way that is environmentally beneficial. Nature-based
entrepreneurship may, however, result in better stewardship.
Notably, some attribute the lack of stewardship to "corporate" farming. See
Dave Henson, The End ofAgribusiness: Dismantling the Mechanisms of Corporate
Rule, in THE FATAL HARVEST READER, supra note 20, at 225-39. As a lawyer, I
can only make sense of the "corporate" claim by construing it as a rhetorical move
that encapsulates concerns about consolidation, increased mechanization, and high
technology. Indeed, some are more careful in their rhetoric, referring to
industrialization as a pitfall or describing what they mean by corporate. See id.
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producers profit have been narrowly defined by the markets they
serve, often to the exclusion of many environmental benefits.
Protecting downstream water quality creates no income for
producers. Carbon storage has made no money, until recently.
Habitat and biodiversity losses are not lost opportunities, but gains in
productive capacity. And there is little incentive for producers to
develop information concerning largely external environmental
benefits.
Changing the economic calculus can make things better. So-called
ecological-services markets and broader efforts at economically
valuing ecosystem services for policymaking purposes are evidence
of a trend to better integrate ecology within economic systems.50
Markets are also emerging as a preferred policy choice for
maintaining or enhancing the environmental benefits that flow from
privately owned farms and ranches. 5' Examples include water-quality
markets, borne of regulatory regimes in some watersheds.52 And
greenhouse-gas regulation has also supported carbon markets.53
Using consumer demand for nature-based activities to produce
habitat and biodiversity gains is another way of envisioning how
market liberalism can support environmental goals, even without the
50. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and
Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 165-66
(1998) (describing this trend); NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
51. See Memorandum from Edward T. Schafer, Secretary, US Dep't of Agric.,
Secretary's Memorandum 1056-001: Establishment of the Office of Ecosystem
Services and Markets (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/
directives/doc/SM1056-001.pdf; RUHL, supra note 1, at 169-247 (providing case
studies); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings ofEcosystem
Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2006) (tracking the development of the
area). The entire Spring 2007 issue of Volume 22 of the Journal of Land Use and
Environmental Law is devoted to the field of ecosystem services and law.
52. See Water Quality Trading, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/
type/watersheds/trading.cfm (last visited Apr 22, 2011).
53. William Boyd & James Salzman, The Curious Case of Greeening in Carbon
Markets, 41 ENVTL L. 73, 78-80 (2011) (evaluating both voluntary and compliance
markets). See also AGRAGATE CLIMATE CREDITS CORP., http://www.agragate.com/
(last visited Apr 22, 2011) (providing information on "climate credits" on
farmlands).
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regulatory genesis. A simple statement I've heard from producers
encapsulates this phenomenon: "If it pays, it stays."54
B. Nature-Based Entrepreneurs and the Problem ofFragmentation
An anecdote from Nebraska helps illustrate the problems facing
landowners who are trying to make nature pay.55 The Switzer family
owns Switzer Ranch,56 near Burwell, Nebraska.57 In 2001, when two
of Bruce Switzer's children wanted to join his operation, the family
saw the need to expand its operation. But rather than acquire more
land for cattle production, the family decided to diversify its
operation. In 2001 they built lodging for guests and began offering
horseback riding, guided hunting, bird watching, and boating services
on a nearby river.58 The family formed Calamus Outfitters as a way
54. In this Article, I do not discuss the very important issue ofcommodification-
-the idea that there are adverse economic, moral, social, and environmental
consequences to making nature pay. See David Ehrenfeld, Hard Times for
Diversity, in THE FATAL HARVEST READER, supra note 20, at 81 ("In the long run,
basing our conservation strategy on the economic value of diversity will only make
things worse, because it keeps us from coping with the root cause of the loss of
diversity."); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849,
1851-52, 1903-14 (1986) (making the case that market inalienability ought to be
based on concerns for human flourishing). It is a significant and often persuasive
argument. But there are some who disagree. See Rose, supra note 50, at 169-74
(describing the objection and concluding that regulation is a "second best" solution
to the problem of partial property, with more property being the "first best"). Here,
I am more concerned eith the means of making nature pay, independent of a
normative judgment about whether or not to introduce more economic returns to
attain better environmental outcomes.
55. Examples from Iowa are offered in Neil D. Hamilton, Rural Lands and
Rural Livelihoods: Using Land and Natural Resources to Revitalize Rural America,
supra note 14, at 179.
56. SWITZER RANCH, http://switzerranch.com (follow "About Us" hyperlink)
(last visited June 28, 2011).
57. Interestingly enough, Burwell is one of the few rural places in the state that
is gaining population and, by some indicators, prospering. David Hendee, Burwell
Bucks Census Odds, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Mar. 27, 2011, available at
http://www.omaha.com/article/20110327/NEWSO1/703279883. The extent to
which this is based on nature-based entrepreneurs in the area remainsunclear, but a
correlation seems plausible.
58. David Hendee, Eco-Tourism a Cash Crop?, OMAHA WORLD HERALD,
March 23, 2011, available at http://www.omaha.com/article/20110323/
NEWS01/703239880.
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of marketing these new endeavors. 59  Today, Calamus Outfitters
offers a wide range of experiences for the paying customer seeking to
experience the beauty of Nebraska's Sandhills region, including its
flora, fauna, wildlife, and ranching heritage. Importantly, the
Switzers continue to raise cattle, which belies any rigid dichotomy
between conservation and production, and illustrates how food
production and nature-based entrepreneurship complement one
another. 60 The Switzer Ranch now supports three growing families.
But problems have emerged. The Switzers, for instance, have
encountered a key limitation-their property boundary. Wildlife
provide the foundation for parts of their business, but the presence of
wildlife depends on how the grassland is managed on a large scale. If
the Switzers' grassland-management choices extended beyond the
reach of their 12,000 acre ranch, wildlife populations could rise and
become more diverse. Access to neighboring lands would also open
up more opportunities for hunting, camping, bird watching, and other
land-based activities. To that end, the Switzers have sought the
cooperation of neighbors to enhance the presence of wildlife on their
and their neighbors' ranches, offering their customers a
geographically and ecologically broader experience.61
The Switzer example shows us that geographic size is critical to
nature-based entrepreneurship in areas where wildlife is an important
resource.62 Ranchers with relatively small tracts of land are unable to
offer experiences that require a larger space. For instance, it takes a
great deal of land to manage a habitat for a sizeable herd of large
mammals, given their home range.63 Most individual ranchers will
not have enough. Expanding the geographic size of the operation is
also likely to increase diversity simply by including a more diverse
59. CALAMUS OUTFITTERS, http://www.calamusoutfitters.com/index.htm (last
visited June 28, 2011).
60. See Hoogesteijn & Hoogesteijn, supra note 3, at 37-50.
61. Environmentalist organizations have noticed the benefits of the Switzers'
effort. Recently, the Audubon Society designated the Switzers' property along
with cooperating neighbors' property as an Important Bird Area called the Greater
Gracie Creek Landscape. It is the first privately owned site in Nebraska so
designated. Greater Gracie Creek Landscape, AUDOBON SoC'Y OF NEB.,
http://www.nebraska.audubon.org/ne-IBAsp27.htm (last visited June 28, 2011).
62. Edwards & Reading, supra note 38, at 5-7.
63. See GRAEME CAUGHLEY & ANNE GUNN, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 309-40 (1996) (discussing objectives, size, number shape,
and location of reserves in Chapter 10: Reserves in Theory and in Practice).
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array of habitat types and the home ranges of smaller-ranging
species. Thus, to the extent income increases with diversity and the
presence of large mammals, bigger is better.
Further, larger size opens up the possibility of allowing or
replicating ecological processes that are impossible or less effective
at small scales (e.g., prairie fires or the grazing pattern of a herd of
wild ungulates).64 And there may be efficiency scales associated
with engaging in certain wildlife-production activities or creating
amenities that cross larger tracts of land. If the cost per acre of such
improvements decreases as more acres are added to the operation,
then bigger is better from a cost perspective. 65
All of these benefits can be attained through the acquisition of
more land. Agricultural land is, however, expensive and it is offered
for sale much less often than other real estate.66 And there are a
variety of reasons for exploring other options, not the least of which is
to avoid concentrated land holdings on our rural landscapes.67
Exploring these other options requires us to think more clearly about
the problem of geographic size.
By geographic size, I refer to the amount of land a producer owns,
bounded by a legally recognized set of geographical boundaries.
Land ownership is, of course, a legal construct that is widely lauded
for its benefits. But there are consequences to fragmenting a
landscape with property boundaries. I have already identified two of
those consequences: the problems it poses to wildlife production and
diversity, and the inability of landowners to achieve scale for some
64. Freese, supra note 34, at 76.
65. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332-34
(1992). Larger tracts may also reduce the risk of geographically isolated
production failures.
66. Bruce Johnson, A Thin Real Estate Market Becomes Even Leaner,
CORNHUSKER ECONOMICS, September 8, 2010, available at http://agecon.unl.edu/
c/document library/get file?uuid=be24fde0-fcf9-436f-8af4-6bf301fdc4af&group
Id=2369805.
67. In fact, the preservation of prosperous rural populations may require a
different option. In this regard, the literature concerning concentrated landholdings
and their deleterious effect on rural communities is relevant. See WALTER
GOLDSCHMIDT, As You Sow (1947) (entirely devoted to the subject); Linda M.
Lobao et al., Still Going: Recent Debates on the Goldschmidt Hypothesis, 58
RURAL Soc. 277 (2010).
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pursuits on tracts of land that are too small.68 Thinking about wildlife
production as a boundary problem helps us better understand
potential solutions other than outright land acquisition.
Property boundaries fragment the management of a landscape,
limiting each landowner's sphere of authority to a particular space.
This limited authority poses a problem for wildlife production. In
order to increase the amount of wildlife, a landowner does not
necessarily need more land. Rather, he needs a method for ensuring
that his neighbors will manage their lands to provide suitable wildlife
habitat, and he needs assurances that this will continue for a sufficient
period of time.69
The nature-based entrepreneur also needs something more than
coordinated management. Eric Freyfogle recently wrote about "the
tragedy of fragmentation," which occurs because "[t]he individual
landowner simply [cannot] capture the benefits of good land use, just
as he d[oes] not bear the full costs of bad land use."70 For our
purposes, the good land use Freyfogle refers to can include the
68. This boundary problem is common to ecosystem governance in general. See
generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002). For instance, with
government approaches to solving environmental and natural resources problems,
political boundaries are problematic when a problem transcends those boundaries.
So-called cross-border collaboration among governmental entities is thus a
common subject in the public sector. See Regional Collaboration, LINCOLN INST.
OF LAND POL'Y, http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/regional-collaboration (last
visited June 28, 2011).
69. On the problem of credible commitment generally, see ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION, 43-45 (2003).
70. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Tragedy of Fragmentation, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 307,
322 (2002). Elmendorf states that, "[t]he ecological benefits of a given form of
investment increase more than proportionately with the number of contiguous acres
subject to treatment." Christopher S. Elmendorf, Securing Ecological Investments
on Other People's Land: A Transaction-Costs Perspective, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J.
529, 534 (2004). This may, however, simply mean that the ecological benefits of
some practices materialize at great distances, beyond the boundaries of the owner's
land--outside of the "contiguous acres subject to treatment."
See also RUHL, supra note 1, at 109. Ruhl and his co-authors describe the
common-law of property as failing to recognizing the values of ecosystem services,
given such legal principles as the doctrine of waste, weak nuisance protection, and
a prohibition on implied negative easements.
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production of resources for a nature-based business. Thus,
Freyfogle's tragedy identifies a further aspect of the boundary
problem: the inability to capture the benefits of wildlife production-
benefits that spill beyond the landowner's boundaries.
For example, if a producer invests in habitat (e.g., by constructing
new facilities or changing one's grazing practices), increased wildlife
populations and associated economic benefits may materialize
beyond his boundaries and out of his reach. These extraterritorial
benefits do not generate a return so long as they remain
extraterritorial. Acquiring more land is, thus, a promising solution,
but only because it gives the landowner a way of capturing the
benefits of his investment-expanding his boundary.
Landowner cooperation is another way to overcome the boundary
problem. Landowners can jointly manage their properties for a better
wildlife resource and jointly capture its benefits. They can create
what Ellickson calls an "external special-purpose boundary."72 By
cooperating in pursuit of this particular purpose, cooperating
landowners are creating a conceptual boundary that is external to
each parcel, enveloping all cooperating landowners' property. As
they move that boundary in pursuit of their common purpose, they
simultaneously increase the size of their landholdings. Thus, through
cooperation, they can take advantage of scale efficiencies, increase
diversity by including species and habitats that one or more of them
did not have individually, produce wildlife with home ranges that fit
within their collective boundary, and capture the benefits of their
investment.73
71. See also Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48
DUKE L.J. 75, 80 (1998).
72. Ellickson, supra note 65, at 1334.
73. Ruhl and his co-authors reject the capacity of landowners to cooperate and
overcome these challenges, stating "property in the United States has become too
valuable, and its management challenges too complex, to expect that it would wind
up being held in substantial amounts by large, amorphous, ungoverned groups of
individuals." RUHL, supra note 1, at 111. I agree with that statement, but
consumers are conspicuously absent from Ruhl's book. I posit that there is room
for improvement among groups of landowners who are driven by consumers to
produce a resource that producers cannot create on their own. While this may not
occur on the scales Ruhl envisions, nor generate all of the ecosystem services that
one may want, it is at least a start. Ruhl, however raises many legitimate questions
about the emergence of these groups. See id. at 164-68 (describing the lack of
institutions in places where one would expect to find them); and at 162-64
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However, demonstrating the need for and utility of landowner
cooperation is only a preliminary step. One must also consider how
to structure cooperation in light of the collective-action problems the
participants are likely to encounter.
The collective-action problems are best conceptualized using
Elinor Ostrom's work evaluating common-pool-resource problems. 74
Cooperating landowners in this context create and use common pool
resources; that is, resources common to the cooperating group, but
from which the group can exclude non-members. 75 Professor Ostrom
has developed two categories of problems facing collective action in
(describing the creation, ultimate demise, and public-law replacement of a regime
governing lobstering in Maine). For a similar rejection of landowner coordination
see Karkkainen, , supra note 68, at 213-14.
74. OSTROM, supra note 69. Professor Ostrom's work has a broader application
as well. For instance, she offers a theory of how individuals cooperate despite the
tragedy of the commons, the prisoner's dilemma, and the logic of collective action.
See id. at 2-7. And her theory stands in conjunction with the theory of the firm and
the theory of the state in explaining how collective action can be achieved. Id. at
38-42. Her analysis establishes how collections of individuals can supply an
institution, solve the problem of credible commitment, and engage in mutual
monitoring--all theoretical necessities to the emergence of collective action. Id. at
42-46. In so doing, she explains how people have overcome the free-rider problem
and the holdout problem in contexts like these.
The holdout and free-rider problems have been touted in the literature as a
very significant impediment to collaboration. See Ellickson, supra note 71, at 76;
Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 428-31. As Ostrom's work demonstrates, the
existence of long-enduring collective action institutions tells us that the holdout and
free-rider problems are overcome in many instances. Thus, there is much more to
explaining how people collaborate.
This Article does not explore the economic and institutional theories
explaining the emergence of collective action. Rather, my point is to consider the
tools that a lawyer could use to help willing collaborators. Thus, I borrow only a
small amount of Ostrom's work--that which I think is the most relevant to
organizing the problems cooperating individuals may face and those characteristics
she has observed in successful collective-action institutions. See infra Part ll.C.
75. OSTROM, supra note 69, at 30-33. The ability to exclude non-members
exists as a function of the existing property boundaries. Each member, of course,
has the ability to keep or allow outsiders on his or her property to partake of the
resources they have created. Even if all landowners grant each other access to their
property, the right to exclude non-members remains intact. Thus, resources created
in common among the members are exclusive to the members. And, although there
may be some resources that spill beyond the landowners' boundaries, those that are
found within it remain exclusive to the members.
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the management of common pool resources: (1) provisioning
problems and (2) allocation problems.76
Provisioning problems are primarily concerned with the production
and maintenance of the resource system 77 that the individuals within
a group will use, and they "may occur on the supply side, on the
demand side, or on both sides."7 Supply-side provisioning problems
are "related to the construction of the resource itself and its
maintenance." 79 Demand-side provisioning problems "involve
regulating withdrawal rates so that they do not adversely affect the
resource itself."80
Provisioning problems in this context initially involve a choice
regarding what exactly the group wants to produce together. The
choices are limited only by the willingness of the participants.
Practically, however, landowners have little reason to cooperatively
produce things they could produce as effectively alone. Thus, the
likely candidates for cooperation are resources that they are unable to
produce alone or resources that they could produce better together
than they could apart.8'
The clearest candidate for provisioning is wildlife, simply because
cooperation is necessary in many cases. With wildlife resources, a
landowner will likely not be able to do much within his or her own
boundaries. Landowner cooperation will be necessary, for example,
to produce species that have home ranges larger than any single
landowners' boundaries or to create a suitable array of habitat types.
Thus, willing participants must contribute to wildlife production by
collectively managing their land to provide a habitat suitable to the
species or array of species they seek to provision.
Additional prospects for cooperative production include the
creation of buildings, campgrounds, hiking trails, and horseback-
76. Id. at xviii.
77. Id. at 30 ("Resource systems are best thought of as stock variables that are
capable, under favorable conditions, of producing a maximum quantity of a flow
variable without harming the stock or the resource system itself.").
78. Id. at 49.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 1 use the terms "as effectively" and "better" in lieu of terms like "at a lower
cost" and "more efficiently" to avoid a singular focus on production economics.
To be sure, economic efficiency is a key variable in these decisions, but
communities my find other reasons to cooperate.
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riding trails. For these items, collective action may be necessary or
better in light of significant up-front costs that exceed any
individual's capacity. Collective action may also be required for
things like trails if their value increases disproportionately as their
length is extended across individual parcels.
Once a group decides what to provision, it must decide who will
bear the costs of provisioning and how to divide these among
participants. For instance, increasing the grassland bird population in
a large landscape may require significant changes to grazing practices
on one landowner's property, but fairly marginal changes to another
landowner's property. Additionally, the cost each landowner
experiences may vary from year to year. Cooperating landowners
will need a means of determining who will bear what provisioning
costs.
All of these problems fall within the realm of supply-side
provisioning problems because they relate to the creation and
maintenance of the resource system.82 Significant demand-side
provisioning problems are likely to arise as well. For instance, if a
group of landowners cooperates to produce wildlife, it will need to
avoid overuse. The clearest example of this problem involves
consumptive uses 83 of wildlife, like hunting. Without a means of
guarding against consumptive overuse, individual actors within the
cooperating group may harm the resource base. This would be a
classic example of Hardin's famous tragedy of the commons. But by
structuring rules for individual use, land users can avoid
overconsumption. 84
82. See id.
83. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE, 1243, 1248
(1968).
84. Many states allocate the consumption of certain species through hunting
laws--a reflection of the common property (or public property) system we have
used to manage wildlife for so long. See, e.g., 163 NEB. ADMIN. CODE Ch. 4 -
Wildlife Regulations (2010), available at http://www.sos.ne.gov/rules-and-
regs/regsearchlRules/Gameand ParksCommission/Title-163/Chapter-4.pdf.
Such laws play a key role in maintaining the wildlife population in the face of
common ownership. However, in some instances, the state's allocation
determinations may not be sufficient. For instance, problems may arise if the
state's allocations are made with reference to geographic boundaries that are much
broader than the cooperating landowners' boundaries. For example, consider a
group of cooperating landowners that successfully attracts hunters with state-issued
permits that were issued by calculating the safe yield of a species at a state level.
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Nature-based activities like hiking, camping, and horseback riding
will also raise demand-side provisioning problems if the parties have
cooperated to produce the facilities supporting them, like trails,
supporting structures (barns, trailheads, etc.) or campgrounds. Again,
the parties should govern use in a way that diminishes the prospect of
damage to the resource, like overcrowding at campgrounds or on
trails.
Allocation problems-Ostrom's second category-involve
allocating resource units. These problems arise when multiple
parties carry on activities that use the resources available to group
members. 86 Solving allocation problems "avoid[s] rent dissipation
and reduce[s] uncertainty and conflict over the assignment of
rights."87
Allocation problems become especially interesting in the case of
mobile resources-resources like wildlife that cross property
boundaries. Such resources are difficult to allocate because "spatial
and temporal distributions of resource units frequently are
heterogeneous and uncertain."88 Limiting each participant to use on
his own land may prove inadequate. Thus, landowners may need to
grant each other access their properties for the purpose of using the
wildlife resources they have created. An alternative would be to
create a compensation system whereby those who cannot get access
to mobile resource are allocated a share of the benefits.
Within the landowners' boundaries, over-consumption at a local level could occur
without having an adverse impact at the state level. Under such circumstances, the
parties must determine how many animals of a given species can be hunted without
harming the local population, despite the state's role in allocation.
85. OSTROM, supra note 69, at 30 ("Resource units are what individuals
appropriate or use from resource systems.. . . The distinction between the resource
as a stock and the harvest of use units as a flow is especially useful in connection
with renewable resources.").
86. See id.
87. Ostrom explains rent dissipation as follows:
Rents are dissipated whenever the marginal returns from an appropriation
process are smaller than the marginal costs of appropriation. Rent
dissipation can occur because too many individuals are allowed to
appropriate from the resource, because appropriators are allowed to
withdraw more than the economically optimal quantity of resource units,
or because appropriators overinvest in appropriation equipment (e.g.
fishing gear).
Id. at 48.
88. Id.
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Mobile resources also pose problems for non-consumptive uses.
For example, hiking, camping, and horseback riding may be more
valuable when wildlife is present. If wildlife appear on some
properties and not others, access for these activities should be
allocated among the parties who created the wildlife resource, or a
compensation system should be created.
Similarly, access to facilities supporting nature-based activities like
hiking, camping, and horseback riding should be allocated to avoid
conflicts concerning their use and guard against over-investment by
individual participants.
Provisioning and allocation problems are also clearly linked to one
another. People will be unlikely to continue participating in
collaborative endeavors if they bear more than their share of the
provisioning costs, or see others getting more than their share of the
allocation benefits.90 What participants view as "their share" will
likely turn on the relative contribution each has made to the
enterprise in relation to their return.91 Thus, those who experience
high costs should be given a higher proportion of the benefits. And
those who experience very little cost should be given a relatively
lower proportion of the benefits. 92 Such proportionality is necessary
to a continued cooperative effort.
C. Reconfiguring Property Boundaries and Cooperating
With cooperation and its problems in mind, one can consider the
legal tools available for facilitating nature-based entrepreneurship.
Many of the problems facing nature-based entrepreneurship lie in our
present use of the property system, so I look to the ability of property
law accommodate solutions. Because a solution can be found in
property law, I conclude that creating broad landowner rights and
fragmenting a landscape with property boundaries do not necessarily
lead to a tragedy of fragmentation. Property law is flexible enough to
create suitable boundaries for nature-based entrepreneurship.
The following discussion explores the "common-interest
community" as a way in which property law can be used to
8 9. Id.
90. Id. at 92.
91. See id
92. Presumably, of course, in all cases benefits will outweigh costs for
participants over time.
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reconfigure property boundaries and facilitate these emerging
businesses. Sub-section one describes the "common-interest
community" generally. While most commonly found in urban areas
as a means of creating and selling communities, these associations
have attributes that could deal with the provisioning and allocation
problems identified above. Sub-section two applies this structure to a
group of nature-based entrepreneurs. Sub-section three explores
institutional design principles that should guide those creating a
common-interest community, as well as potential solutions to the
collective-action problems that may arise. Sub-section four discusses
additional beneficial uses of common-interest associations-a typical
feature of a common-interest community. Sub-section five briefly
explains how the property-law solution discussed in this Article
relates to other means of carrying out the cooperative effort.
1. The Common-Interest Community
The "common-interest community" is a generic term for what most
laypeople know as the homeowners' association used in many
residential developments. 93 These communities are founded upon
rights and duties that inhere in the title to real estate and affect the
property owners individually and collectively. 94 The management and
oversight of these rights and duties, among other things, is often
carried out through a governing association. 95
The foundational rights and duties of a common-interest
community are created through servitudes. The term "servitude"is a
"generic term that describes legal devices private parties can use to
create rights and obligations that run with the land." 96 In essence,
servitudes move rights from one parcel of property to another parcel
or parcels of property.97 This tool allows property owners to
reconfigure boundaries, moving conceptual slices of property among
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 cmt. C (2000);
WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 3-4 (2008).
94. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 6; RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY, Ch. 54 & 54A (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2010).
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.7 cmt. a (2000).
96. Id. at § 1.1 cmt. a.
97. See Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829,
842-46 (2004).
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the parties to the agreement. 98 The slices become part of the property
each landowner owns; they are a reconfiguration of the rights and
obligations attending property ownership, not simply obligations and
rights that bind property owners. 99 As the Restatement (Third) of
Property puts it, "[r]ights and obligations that run with land are
useful because they create land-use arrangements that remain intact
despite changes in ownership of the land."100
The servitudes of a common-interest community obligate the
owner to engage in and refrain from certain land uses.10' For
instance, in the urban setting, the construction and maintenance of the
dwelling is often regulated, with an eye toward the aesthetic impact
of the structures built on the property.102 Such regulations place
burdens on individual parcels of real estate, but they also benefit the
community as a whole. Each individual parcel often contains the
same restrictions, reciprocally benefitting each of the other parcels in
the development.
The servitudes also may create a common-interest association and
vest it with authority to hold common property, 103 provide
services,104 perform administrative functions, enforce the servitudes,
and raise revenue for its operations through fees assessed on property
owners. o0 The association can be formalized as a separate legal
entity (for example, as a limited liability company, corporation, or
trust) or it can exist as an unincorporated association. 06 In any event,
the servitudes will vest each member of the group with membership
in the association and attendant voting authority as an incident of
their property ownership.107 The association's operations are
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 cmt. a (2000).
101. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 14.
102. Id. at 345.
103. Bike trails, parks, and exercise facilities are typical examples of association
property held for the benefit of the owners in common.
104. Trash collection, snow removal, and lawn care are examples of services
performed by an association for its members.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 cmt. c (2000).
106. RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, Ch. 54A-18 (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., 2010; HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 94, at 32-33.
107. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 14.
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governed by documents such as articles of incorporation and bylaws,
depending upon the legal form the association takes. 08
In the urban setting, common-interest communities are created by
developers in conjunction with the subdivision and development
process, long before individual parcels are sold and developed.'09
After servitudes are declared and the association documents created,
landowners join the community by buying a parcel. "0
2. Using Common-Interest Communities to Solve the Boundary
Problem
Given the variety of factual scenarios that will emerge in the
grasslands setting and the various preferences participants will have,
it is difficult to offer a vision of how a particular common-interest
community should look.
The specific parameters of a common-interest community are, of
course, driven by the needs of the parties creating it. These clients
have particular goals, values, experiences, and tolerance levels that
impact how their community should be structured. The lawyer's job
is to provide a solution that suits their clients' needs and helps them
achieve their goals, using suitable legal tools. What the lawyer
creates must have the features they need without accessories that are
useless or, worse, problematic."' The problems identified above
help the lawyer better understand what his or clients need.
Before explaining how a common-interest community can meet
these needs, one preliminary matter merits consideration. The use of
a common-interest community is somewhat atypical outside of the
residential real-estate market where a developer designs the
community's initial terms and people join by buying lots within the
project. On a rural landscape like that under consideration, there will
be no front-end involvement of a developer and subsequent purchase
by individual members. While that progression could occur on rural
landscapes, the point of this Article is to explore legal tools that
would enable existing landowners to pursue nature-based enterprises.
108. Id at 14, 32-33.
109. Id. at 31-32.
110. Id. at 14.
111. See also HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 38-40 (discussing the
attorney's role).
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There is, however, reason to believe that a common-interest-
community approach could be adapted to nature-based
entrepreneurship. In this context, a common-interest community
would create a common enterprise that provides secure commitments,
produces resources, and allocates resources among landowners. Thus,
a common-interest community in this setting is less like a residential
development and more like creating irrigation facilities, building
cooperative storage facilities for agricultural commodities, or creating
rules to govern the use of an inland fishery or common pasture.112
All of those enterprises are common examples of people cooperating
to produce and use resources they could not create (or could not
create as effectively) on their own, without the front-end involvement
of a developer. Those enterprises did not involve the use of
common-interest communities to collaborate, but they did not face
the same property boundary problem, and they did not involve the
same sort of land-based resources. Given those two aspects of
collaboration in this setting, a common-interest community may be
an appropriate and well-suited tool for the task of nature-based
entrepreneurship, even if its use here is somewhat atypical." 3 At the
very least, a creative and careful lawyer can certainly fashion an
appropriate solution..1 14
112. See Rose, supra note 50, at 178-79. Rose mentions other examples and
notes that common-law regimes like nuisance law and riparianism are common-
property regimes, "It has only been a failure of our imagination that has kept us
from seeing these judicially created regimes for what they are--common property
regimes involving emergent resource uses, including only imprecisely specified
participants." Id. at 178-79. But see RUHL, supra note 1, at 109 (concluding that
the common-law common-property regimes have not been adapted to take
ecosystems services seriously).
113. There are others that may work as well. Those options are explored infra
section II.C.45.
114. Ruhl and his co-authors appear to disagree. RUHL, supra note 1, at 110,
158-68. Ruhl demonstrates that "social norms" are an insufficient means of
making meaningful headway with regard to ecosystem services. Id. at 158-68. But
at other times he acknowledges the ability of landowners to come together and
effectively order their arrangement. Id. at 110. Perhaps my focus on private law
(other than the common law) and institutional design adds something to that work,
exploring the inside of these arrangements and the tools available. But, as Ruhl
states, outside the boundaries of the newly created commons, property law offers
little protection.
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One problem identified above is the need for secure commitments
among participants.' 15 Using servitudes should provide an important
level of security. Because a servitude binds the land (not just the
owner),ll6 it should guard against defection and provide each
landowner with the sort of credible commitment that encourages
individual investment.'7 Given the durability of servitudes,
however, establishing a termination date or a renewal obligation
seems appropriate. Perpetuity, of course, raises legal concerns in
some states. But even long-term encumbrances can become
problematic if the endeavor waxes and wanes. For instance, times
change and some obligations may become ill-suited to a given
enterprise. Without a termination date, or at least the opportunity to
consider renewal, the parties would be bound to the obligation for the
remainder of the term. Of course, longevity has benefits too. The
parties will want to select a time frame within which their hopes and
expectations can materialize.
Beyond the general utility of servitudes, the details of how to vary
property boundaries will depend on what the landowners have chosen
to provision and allocate. As for supply-side provisioning problems,
the servitudes should establish the rights and obligations necessary to
produce the resources they will hold in common. With regard to
wildlife, for instance, each owner should agree to manage his or her
land in a way that enhances and supports the wildlife population.
The benefits of such an obligation should be made to run to the other,
similarly encumbered properties. With regard to jointly created trails
and campgrounds, the parties should configure construction,
maintenance, and operation obligations.
Demand-side provisioning problems should also be addressed
through servitudes. Thus, the servitudes should place appropriate
limitations on the number of visitors, the amount of game that can be
harvested, the timing and intensity of use activities like hiking,
horseback riding, camping, and so on. The ultimate goal will be to
protect the resource system from damage.
Allocation problems should also be addressed in order to give the
parties reliable expectations regarding the use of resource units and
avoid conflicts among users over their use. If access is necessary to
115. See supra notes 69--71 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
117. See OSTROM, supra note 69, at 43-44.
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effectively allocate temporally and spatially complex common-pool
resources, the servitudes should grant each landowner access to each
other's properties to conduct use activities.
Provisioning and allocation issues may become relatively
complicated in the grasslands setting. In other settings, deciding the
rights and obligations necessary to make the project work is not as
difficult. It is not particularly difficult, for instance, to create
restrictions limiting the types of grass to be planted in lawns or
limiting the height of, or the materials to be used in, fences. Both
correspond to the idea of beauty (or the potential for profit) employed
by those drafting the servitude.
Matters are not that simple with managing grasslands wildlife
production and using those lands for ranching and nature-based
activities. The sciences of grassland management, wildlife biology,
and ecology will be important, but there is a great deal of uncertainty
concerning what land uses will be beneficial to the overall effort.
Intensive grazing, controlled bums, species introduction, stocking
ratios, fencing, fence removal, and a variety of other aspects of land
management will be important. And operating at a large scale may
mean that some lands must be treated differently than others because
of their physical location or ecological significance. Inventorying
species will be an important step in making management choices and,
depending on the data, the details of provisioning and allocation
solutions may need to change over time.
Further difficulties may ensue from the uncertain nature of the
returns some activities may yield, as well as uncertainty concerning
the level of use that pooled resources can sustain. Indeed,
experimentation and adaptive management may be the only truly
workable approaches to effective provisioning and allocation in this
context. Unlike the residential property setting, where manicured
lawns and no-wood fences for every parcel in the development
correspond to a collective view of beauty or have been proven in the
marketplace to enhance value,119 the outcomes here are more
uncertain and the choices associated with generating those outcomes
can be complex.
118. See Nick Salafsky et al., Improving the Practice of Conservation: A
Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda for Conservation Science, 16
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1469 (2002); Karkkainen, supra note 68, at 199-206.
119. See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 5.
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The complexity can be dealt with by engaging experts and
fashioning the servitudes at a highly detailed level that spells out the
practices each landowner must perform and his or her allowed level
of use. This can provide certainty to participants, but the prospect of
change or failure must be adequately considered. To do so, at the
least, an amendment mechanism should be employed. 120  That
amendment mechanism would give landowners the power to amend
the servitudes under a set of procedures spelled out in the servitude.
The requisite quantum of owners involved in the amendment process
could vary from majority rule (by participant or by acreage or
whatever) to unanimity.121 Again, the choice would be one for the
group to make in creating their common-interest community.122
However, a further level of complexity emerges. As mentioned
above, provisioning and allocation decisions must consider the
contributions and returns of other members. 123  Thus, the
provisioning and allocation terms contained in a set of servitudes
should be crafted in a way that ensures proportionality between costs
and benefits. Achieving this congruence between relatively
complicated provisioning and allocation choices involves a further
level of difficulty. For instance, by what metric should a
provisioning contribution be judged (e.g., by the environmental
benefits flowing from the improvement, the costs associated with it,
or both)? Determining the value of allocations could involve
similarly difficult questions. Both difficulties are present when one
seeks to maintain proportionality.
Again, an amendment mechanism would be an important means of
maintaining proportionality between costs and benefits going
forward. However, given the potential complexity of the rights and
duties at issue and the need to maintain proportionality, it may not be
feasible to state the provisioning obligations and allocation rights at a
high level of detail. And even if they can be stated at the outset, there
will likely be a need to continually adapt provisioning measures and
adjust allocations. Indeed, enunciating standards or goals (as
opposed to rules and concrete obligations) may be nearly all that can
120. Id. at 455-57.
121. Id. at 456-58.
122. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: SERVITUDES § 6.10 (2000)
(providing default rules that can be displaced by express statements in the
declaration).
123. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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be set forth with any certainty at the outset. Moreover, the creation
of obligations and rights does little to ensure enforcement and does
not give the parties any sort of a financing mechanism to help pay
enforcement or management costs and hire assistance.
A common-interest association can solve many of these problems
or at least give the parties a means to address them. Using an
association helps further unify cooperating landowners within a new
"external special-purpose boundary,"l 24 providing them with an
institutional framework through which they can nimbly make the
- 125provisioning and allocation decisions necessary to their enterprise.
An association can be empowered and limited in whatever way the
parties deem appropriate. For instance, the association could be
vested with the power to hire habitat and wildlife experts to seek
input on effective and appropriate wildlife and habitat measures, thus
helping the parties deal with the difficulties they may encounter in
managing a landscape for wildlife production. More importantly, an
association can allow parties to frame obligations at a fairly broad
level. That is, the servitudes can provide the association with
discretion to determine what landowners must do in order to attain
their collective goals, leaving sufficient leeway to engage in an
adaptive effort. By vesting landowners with membership in an
association that will, in turn, administer servitude obligations within
the group, the landowners can free themselves from the need to
enunciate fine-grained servitudes spelling out each participant's
rights and obligations. Rather, the association's power to create rules
concerning provisioning and allocation can be set forth in the
servitudes along with an obligation for each landowner to abide by
those rules. In essence, then, the landowners will create an entity
through which they may govern themselves, creating and adjusting
the rights and duties necessary to adequately provision and allocate
resources and maintain proportionality between costs and benefits for
individual participants.
A similar approach can be found in design standards for new
houses in residential common-interest communities.126 In some
instances, the servitudes impose specific requirements on landowners
124. Ellickson, supra note 65, at 1334.
125. In broad terms, these associations implicate the lessons of good government.
Procedure, minority rights, decision-making standards, and the like are all elements
of good government. They are elements of good governance as well.
126. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 345-47.
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within the development to use certain materials or build to a
minimum size. However, beyond those parameters, care must be
taken to ensure that new homes enhance (or do not diminish) the
value of surrounding properties. As a result, many servitudes for
residential common-interest communities empower the association to
review plans for proposed structures and require landowners to get
approval before they start building. Standards are set at the
developer's chosen level of specificity, and it is good practice to
define the standards in terms that are as concrete as possible. But to a
greater or lesser extent, the association has the discretion to approve
proposals based on those standards. 127 The same structure can be
employed in the grasslands setting.
The question of how much discretion to give the association-how
broadly or narrowly to frame the servitudes that the association will
administer-depends in large part on the level of control each
individual member will have and the community values they seek to
implement.12 8 Control will be determined though (1) the voting rights
that each member has and (2) the quantum of votes necessary to take
a particular action.129 The servitudes will make each landowner a
member of the association and give him or her voting rights.130 The
allocation of voting rights need not, however, be "one person, one
vote." Perhaps each member should have equal say. But a group
could easily conclude that each member's share of control should be
determined according to the acreage he or she holds. Or perhaps each
member's share of control should depend upon an environmental
benefits index that would, in turn, provide a further incentive for the
creation of such benefits on the lands involved.131 Additionally, the
127. Id. at 345-89 (describing the practice of common-interest communities and
design standards)
128. See id at 34-37 (providing a thorough description of community creation in
the development process).
129. See id. at 32-34.
130. Id. at 32.
131. A common example of an environmental benefits index is that employed in
the Conservation Reserve Program to rank offers for enrollment. See generally
FARM SERV. AGENCY, CRP SIGN-UP 26 ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS INDEX (May
2003), available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA File/crpebi03.pdf. The
Farm Service Agency quantifies practices like habitat cover, wildlife enhancement,
geographic significance, and works them into a formula to identify the most
environmentally beneficial lands proposed for enrollment. A similar approach
could be adopted in a common-interest community.
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percentage of voting interests necessary to take a particular action
could vary from a bare majority to unanimity and could vary
according to the type of decision at issue.
A common-interest association's revenue authority could also be
useful. As mentioned above, servitudes in a common-interest
community often involve an obligation to pay money to an
association to fund association activities. 32 The servitude may spell
out (or the association may be given the authority to determine) the
amount of the fee, the metric for its calculation, and the purposes for
which the revenue may be spent. 133 The revenue will help the
association finance its activities and provide the members with a way
of sharing costs at a communal level. Obviously, it will take money
for the association to undertake certain improvements. For instance,
the removal of invasive species could be financed through the
association. Each owner's payment may also solidify his or her stake
in the operation, especially in conjunction with the expectation that
the funds will be spent on improvements or maintenance that benefit
the landowners collectively.
The revenue mechanism is also a useful tool for keeping costs and
benefits proportional for individual participants, For instance,
compensation from association revenue for disproportionate
landowner provisioning (which benefits the association as a whole)
can be used to keep provisioning and allocation congruent. Suppose,
for example, that one area of land within an association needs to
undergo a controlled bum, but the loss of acreage will be particularly
detrimental to one or more ranchers. Association dues would be used
to compensate the individual rancher1 34 without reallocating resource
units to maintain proportionality.
Association dues could also be calculated from resource-based
income and used to compensate members for their provisioning
activities.3 perhaps This sort of a fee structure would redistribute
132. See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 271-343.
133. See id. at 287-91.
134. Lost income, of course, is just one metric by which disproportionate costs
can be detected. Others would include comparing the value of a member's
provisioning activities to the value of a member's allocation. Determining those
values can become a complex task, but an association can be given the discretion to
experiment as it determines when and how its revenue should be distributed.
135. Identifying the amount of compensation would also involve the selection of
a metric for valuing provisioning contributions. For instance, out-of-pocket
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some members' income to those members who contributed to the
enterprise but were unable to realize the benefits, perhaps due to a
lack of access to those resources. This would also keep benefits and
costs proportional among the members and could be used in instances
where landowners are unwilling to give their neighbors access to
their properties.
In sum, the possibilities are numerous, but the general goal of using
a common-interest community, complete with a suitably empowered
association, is to vary a fragmented landscape's property boundaries
with binding and credible servitudes that create a governance
structure to collectively administer rights and obligations. In the
grasslands context, the utility of this property-based, democratic,
private-governance structure is similar to that found in other
contexts: it is a means for collective choice though which participants
can achieve common goals. Property law here, as elsewhere, gives
landowners the flexibility to create the boundaries and institutional
structure necessary to meet those goals on the necessary scale.
3. Institutional Design, Collective Choice, and Common-Interest
Associations
Essentially, a common-interest association in this context would be
an institution where cooperating landowners can govern the use of
common-pool resources. As such, the analysis would not be
complete without considering Ostrom's principles of institutional
design. Ostrom has identified a series of design principles that she
has observed in many long-enduring self-initiated institutions for
collective action among relatively small groups of individuals:
1. Clearly defined boundaries. The boundaries of the
resource system (e.g., irrigation system or fishery) and the
individuals or households with rights to harvest resource
units are clearly defined.
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs.
Rules specifying the amount of resource products that a
expenses could be used to determine the value of provisioning contributions, but
that amount could also be reduced if the practice benefits the landowner
individually.
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user is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules
requiring labor, materials, and/or money inputs.
3. Collective-choice arrangement. Many of the individuals
affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in
the group who can modify these rules.
4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit biophysical
conditions and user behavior, are at least partially
accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.
5. Graduated sanctions. Users who violate rules-in-use are
likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the
seriousness and context of the offense) from other users,
from officials accountable to these users, or from both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanism. Users and their officials
have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve
conflict among users or between users and officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rights of
users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external governmental authorities, and users have long-
term tenure rights to the resource.136
A common-interest association can observe, and should observe,
these principles. Ostrom's clear-boundaries principle (her first) states
that the boundaries of the resource system must be clearly defined
and the individuals who have rights in the resource system must be
identified. When the parties create a common-interest association,
they will be altering clearly delineated property boundaries and
enunciating what the scope of their collaborative effort is. Thus, it
should meet this criterion.
As I have mentioned already, the proportional equivalence
principle (Ostrom's second) can be met and probably can be observed
more easily through the association and a revenue device. In addition,
136. OSTROM, supra note 69, at 90; ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 259 (2005). Ostrom's eighth design principle-that
multiple layers of nested enterprises be responsible for appropriation, provisioning,
monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities-is most
often observed in large complex systems. Id. I therefore omit this principle from
the following discussion, but it should be noted that a layered or federal structure
may emerge as necessary if a collective effort grows to a large enough size or if
there is a need for coordination among many groups of cooperating landowners.
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active, accountable monitors, graduated sanctions,1 37 and conflict-
resolution' 38  (Ostrom's fourth, fifth, and sixth principles,
respectively) can be built into the governance documents of the
- - -139
association or observed in the association's operations.
Ostrom's collective-choice principle (her third) and minimal-
recognition principle (her seventh) remain. I take up the minimal-
recognition principle in Part III, below. Her collective-choice
principle merits extended attention here.
As an initial matter here, a common-interest association, by
definition, has the sort of stakeholder participation that Ostrom
observes in her collective-choice principle: participants affected by
allocation and provisioning rules are included in the group who can
modify these rules. All landowners are affected by the rules they
create through the association and they have the power to change
those rules when needed. 140
However, collective-choice problems can emerge within such
groups. As with any organization, an opportunity exists for those in
control to take advantage of those with a minority stake. Thus, one
challenge facing the parties is to create a structure in which
controlling participants are less likely to expropriate benefits from the
minority.
There are at least six potential checks on this sort of opportunism.
The first is the ability to exit the arrangement. For example,
termination provisions could be used to protect minority rights. But
if the minority is given such a tool, then the minority use that tool to
137. The RESTATEMENT explicitly recognizes the ability of common-interest
associations to "adopt reasonable rules and procedures to encourage compliance
and deter violations." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.8 (2000).
138. Judicial enforcement of the obligations and rights created in a private law
setting is the default means of resolving conflicts in the United States. Such a
forum can be time consuming and often costly, but it is often local given the way
state courts are organized. Alternative dispute resolution techniques, like
arbitration, are an alternative. Additionally, the servitudes could set up a dispute
resolution process within the association. That, in turn, could be designed with low-
cost and rapid-response considerations in mind. Dispute resolution could also occur
informally, which may be likely in this setting.
139. See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 423-24.
140. Observing this principle also helps deal with the problem of defection. To
the extent a landowner is satisfied with the process (if not the result) and is assured
of a continuing voice in the association's operation, he or she is more likely to join
the collective effort, remain engaged, and resist the temptation to defect.
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expropriate undue benefits from the majority. Another form of exit is
each individual's ability to sell the land to a new owner.141 But exit
through sale may not be a suitable exit strategy because buyers may
discount their purchase price in light of the problems they will
encounter. Thus, selling the property does little to protect the seller
from majoritarian overreaching.
The second check is to limit the level of association discretion on
certain matters. Perhaps the parties will choose to limit the
governance authority of the association in relation to provisioning
and allocation questions. For instance, the parties may create a
baseline allocation for association members, a maximum
provisioning obligation, and cap the revenue obligation in a way that
limits the prospect or the magnitude of overreaching. 142 But
spelling out such matters in detail poses the problems I've discussed
above; the parties may need more flexibility.
The third check is to manipulate the percentage of votes necessary
to take action on provisioning and allocation questions. Unanimity
would, of course, avoid majoritarian overreaching, but this creates the
possibility of minority holdouts who may overreach. Indeed,
deadlock could ensue.
The fourth is similar to the third: the parties could manipulate the
allocation of voting power. Perhaps a creative lawyer can fashion a
mechanism vesting control among members based on their relative
contributions to the enterprise. But there are significant metric
problems associated with converting contributions to votes. And
even if control is always vested in those who have experienced the
most costs, those members will still be able to extract
disproportionate benefits from the minority (though, perhaps, not as
disproportionate).
The fifth check addresses the longevity of the enterprise. Perhaps
over the long term, power shifts, contributions, and benefits will
balance despite a disconnect between costs and control. But the
141. Unlike with closely held corporations (or similar entities), where a market
for the individual's interest may not exist, the property foundation of the interests
in these enterprises may increase the probability of a market-based exit.
142. Servitude law would be particularly adept at this because servitudes are not
generally subject to majoritarian amendment. Obligations created by servitudes in
common-interest communities, by default, cannot normally be materially changed
without the assent of all beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.10 (2000).
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parties have no assurance that will happen, nor do they know the time
frame in which it might happen. Moreover, controlling interests
could use their power to keep a reallocation from occurring.
The sixth, and perhaps the most likely, check is the social settings
in which these enterprises are likely to emerge. Perhaps landowners
will be as concerned about what their neighbor gets as they are about
what they get. Such a phenomenon is not unheard of within close
communities or small enterprises. But social ties often cut both
ways. Neighbors fall out of favor with one another and seemingly
unrelated conflicts can trickle into association governance and
decision-making. 43
Notably, Ostrom's principles are, in part, an answer to the
collective-choice problem.14 4  Her principles are derived from
observations of institutions that have endured over the long term and
largely avoided the overreaching problem, at least to the extent it
would either inhibit creation or tear apart the endeavor. But even she
acknowledges that explaining how new institutions come to be and
how they adapt in the face of overreaching opportunities is difficult.
She agrees that it involves "establishing trust and establishing a sense
of community" that deserves study "not in protest against the notion
of rational choice, but rather in an effort to understand how
rationality on the part of individuals leads to coherence at the level of
society. "45 And in her observations of field settings, she explains the
emergence of institutions as occurring at multiple levels, involving
incremental and sequential changes to constitutional rules (governing
processes of formulation, governance, adjudication and
modification), collective-choice rules (governing policy-making,
management, and adjudication), and operational rules (governing
processes of appropriation, provisioning, monitoring, and
enforcement) in various arenas. 146 There is, of course, much more to
143. See Mark Cooney, Why is Economic Analysis So Appealing to Law
Professors?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2219, 2219-21 (1993) (noting instances of feuding
in non-cooperative groups).
144. OSTROM, supra note 69, at 185-216 (explaining how the institutions with
her principles solve the problem of institutional supply, credible commitment, and
mutual monitoring in conjunction with "fallible, norm-adopting individuals who
pursue contingent strategies in complex and uncertain environments").
145. Id. at 43 (quoting Robert H. Bates, Contra Contractarianism: Some
Reflections on the New Institutionalism, 16 POLITICS AND SOCIETY 387, 399
(1988)).
146. Id. at 52-53.
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Ostrom's framework, but, in the end, she acknowledges something
very important about her principles:
I do not think it is possible to elucidate necessary and
sufficient principles for enduring institutions, as it takes a
fundamental willingness of the individuals involved to
make any institution work. No set of logical conditions is
sufficient to ensure that all sets of individuals will be
willing and able to make an institution characterized by
such conditions work. 14 7
In the end, there is no prescription for dealing with this problem.
At best, participants should discuss the issue, consider the utility and
drawbacks of different options, and decide how they want to deal
with it in designing their institution.
4. Doing More with Common Interest Communities
Thus far, this Article has focused on the common-interest
community and its attendant association as a collective governance
mechanism. Through such an arrangement, multiple landowners can
come together to produce common-pool resources and decide upon
the allocation of those resources in a way that creates a new special
purpose boundary. I have assumed that each landowner would utilize
the allocated resources to provide income to their own operations.
However, several permutations can arise once the landowners start
collaborating through a common-interest community.
147. Id. at 229 n.36. There is at least some data suggesting such a motivation
may be present in rural populations.
[L]and figures into agriculturalists' utilitarianism as more than a means to
money. Sustaining independence, tradition, and community relations
matter too. This works against environmentalism when, for example, the
tradition relates to wiping out a species like the prairie dog; but it is also
cause for hope, insofar as people who relate to land solely as a source of
profit are wont to shirk in cooperative conservation ventures. Those who
value community highly would seem the least likely shirkers.
See Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 443. For an account of rural stereotypes,
including communitarian assumptions, depicted in judicial opinions, see Pruitt,
supra n. 2, at 225-33. It remains to be seen whether bringing a profit motive to
conservation can simultaneously take advantage of agriculturalists' liberal and
communitarian tendencies.
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For instance the discussion above assumes that the servitudes will
benefit and burden each landowner reciprocally and that the
association would decide on the finer points of provisioning and
allocation. However, another option would be to make the
association the beneficiary of all the obligations placed on the
properties. Thus, the association would have access to the properties
for hunting, hiking, wildlife viewing, camping, or other uses of the
provisioned resources. Under this sort of an arrangement, the
association could operate more as a business venture and distribute
the revenue to the association's members. In other words, the
allocation function of the association would turn from managing
allocation rights to distributing earnings to the members. 148
One could also envision an arrangement in which the association
contracts with a third-party outfitter to use the resources that have
been effectively pooled at the associational level. The payment such
an outfitter would make to the association would then be distributed
to the association's owners.
Common-interest associations also often hold common property-
land or structures owned collectively by the group through the
association. 149 Such an of arrangement may be helpful in this setting
if the landowners were to collectively acquire more land or jointly
build facilities to assist them in their efforts.
The association can also act as a focal point for dealing with other
entities. For instance, the association could compete for grants
focused on creating or enhancing wildlife habitat. A group of
landowners operating through an association that has a secure level of
control over a vast acreage may compete very well for such funding.
5. Other Legal Tools
Common-interest communities and their associations are, of
course, only one means by which landowners can collaborate. They
are a particularly appropriate means given the property boundary
problem and the way in which servitudes and an empowered
148. This kind of collective ownership would also seem to be more clearly a risk
management strategy that producers could use to guard against geographically
isolated production failures. Cf Ellickson, supra note 65, at 1341-42 (indicating
that the allocation of the benefits of collective provisioning could qualify as a risk
management technique).
149. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 6.
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association can modify property boundaries. But there is a spectrum
of ways to accomplish the same ends, ranging from purely informal
arrangements among landowners to governmental involvement.
Below, I describe the different approaches landowners could take,
briefly mention a few benefits and drawbacks of each, and discuss the
benefits of formalizing cooperation through private law tools.
In purely informal arrangements, landowners customarilymanage
their lands for the presence of wildlife and allocate access for
hunting, open lands for camping, and so on. Such customs may
extend to both provisioning and allocation issues. However, in such
a setting there is no formal means (e.g., resort to the courts) to
enforce the land management regime or govern individual resource
uses. This is not to say that such efforts are ineffective. Rather, they
may be highly effective within a community with strong social ties at
relatively small scales. so Thus, this arrangement is a viable approach
to nature-based entrepreneurship.
At the other end of the spectrum is public law. Government-
which represents the collective will of a particular geographic area's
voters-can utilize its land to provision wildlife and open its lands to
users. On private lands, governmental regulations can require owners
to provision wildlife and open their lands to others, subject to
constitutional limitations requiring compensation to landowners in
some instances.15 1  Government can also control the allocation of
resources through permit requirements, controls on the size of
campgrounds, land use regulations, and a variety of other methods.
The prospect of direct governmental provisioning and allocation of
nature-based activities on the Northern Great Plains is somewhat
remote because less than twenty-five percent of this region is publicly
owned.152 Moreover, less than two percent of the land area is both
publicly owned and managed for biodiversity conservation. 153 In fact,
most governmental approaches in this region consist of costly land
purchases, regulatory approaches that place politically unpalatable (if
150. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Ellickson, supra note 65, at 1400. One
would expect to find Ostrom's traits among such effective institutions. See also
RUHL, supra note 1, at 158-68.
151. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152. Freese et al., supra note 34, at 71.
15 3. Id.
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not constitutionally suspect) 154 wildlife-provisioning burdens on
landowners, and incentive programs.155  Both are increasingly
unpopular among landowners.
In between the purely informal approach and the governmental or
public-law approach is the prospect of formal collaboration among
landowners using private law tools like the property-based common-
interest community described above. There are, of course, other
private-law tools in the lawyer's toolbox. A purely contractual
approach could vary the management choices of cooperating
landowners and allow them to effectively vary their property
boundaries. But contract law may not be the best tool for observing
Ostrom's principles. The key differences between property and
contract law in this setting are property law's abilities to (1) vest the
rights and duties of agreeing landowners in the real estate's title (not
simply among the landowners) and (2) require the performance of the
obligations in the event of breach.156  Contract law, of course,
usually places the obligation only on the parties to the contract and
generally limits their recovery to monetary damages. 157 Given those
limitations, property law may be a superior choice for creating long-
term tenure rights in the resource system.158
Another private law tool is business associations law. Landowners
could create a legal entity to which cooperating landowners transfer
their titles in return for ownership interests in the entity. Once
created, individual landowners would no longer own the real estate,
but they would own shares of the entity, which would then own and
manage the real estate. Provisioning and allocation decisions could
be made at the entity level under the direction of management, which
may or may not include owners. Using an entity would also eliminate
the need for cross-border collaboration as all lands would be under a
154. FREYFOGLE, supra note 5, at 97-101 (describing property rights resistance to
land-health initiatives).
155. Stephanie Stem, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral
Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 541, 542 (2006).
156. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 470 (2000).
157. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 769-70 (3d ed. 1999).
158. See OSTROM, supra note 136, at 259 (principle of minimal recognition of
organizational rights); see also Shea B. Airey, Conservation Easements in Private
Practice, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 745, 755 (2010) (stating that a monetary
remedy may be insufficient to protect the "environmental, habitat, or scenic values
of land").
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single owner's-the entity's-control,159 but it would not eliminate
the problems associated with collective action. Thus, the entity
should observe Ostrom's design principles in its internal governance.
The participants would have the ability to do so because business
associations are largely contractarian. This approach, however, may
not appeal to landowners who would rather own land than shares in
an entity. Many farmers and ranchers may want to maintain
ownership of that place they call home.
Finally, some have offered a corporate/government hybrid
approach as a possibility. According to this approach, legislation
could enable landowners to form a governmental entity-a special
district-that is empowered to raise revenue and govern landowner
activities to deal with provisioning and allocation problems. 160
Special districts are quasi-governmental, but they have aspects of a
business association because they are typically created to perform a
narrow function and act in a proprietary capacity. Unlike purely
private-law approaches, this approach needs specific enabling
legislation, which, hopefully, would observe Ostrom's principles.
This approach is also unique in its ability to overcome the holdout
problem-a feat that private law cannot accomplish. 16 1
There are two downsides to the special district approach. The first
has to do with its legislative genesis. As a legislative product,
landowners would have to await enabling legislation and would be
bound by the terms of that legislation. The upside of using private
law is the ability to avoid awaiting the resolution of a political fight
concerning environmental values in the agricultural sector. That
political fight would likely involve interests external to a group of
cooperating landowners and, thus, may involve obligations or rights
that cooperating landowners would not want to create on their own.
The second downside has to do with the consequences of avoiding
159. Stated in property boundary terms, it or expands the ownership boundary
instead of creating an external special purpose boundary. See Ellickson, supra note
65, at 1334.
160. The following articles have suggested this approach: Ellickson, supra note
71; Elmendorf, supra note 70, at 529; Elmendorf, supra note 45; Barton Thompson
Jr, Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 245
(2002).
161. Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 428-49; Elmendorf, supra note 70, at 554-60
(also arguing that these arrangement would decrease transaction costs for third
parties like land trusts that are seeking to assemble lands).
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the holdout problem. That is, forcibly including a minority interest
into the special district could have adverse consequences.
None of these tools are mutually exclusive. For instance, informal
arrangements may sufficiently provide the resources that a given
operation needs, but perhaps a contract is necessary to govern
allocation and access. Similarly, a property-based regime may work
well for a group of landowners in need of heightened provisioning,
but entity or governmental involvement might be better for allocation
purposes. Thus, no single approach should be taken as complete or
isolated.
There are also many different legal arrangements that lawyers can
create within some of the rough categories depicted above, each with
different parameters. 16 2 For instance, the choice of a particular
business association (e.g., a corporation, a limited liability company,
a trust, etc.) may be influenced by tax consequences and the
particular state's law governing such entities' operations and
authorized activities.163 Within property law, there are a number of
ways to vary property rights, including, for example, conservation
easements and leases. Finally, special districts are as varied as they
are common.164
Mentioning this array of finer-grained choices helps place the
common-interest community in context and elucidates how many
different legal tools can be used to solve the problem of
162. One important consideration in devising a legal strategy for collective action
is to consider the capacity of the tool to accommodate the parties' needs. This is
especially true given the need to observe Ostrom's principles. As among the
different approaches, contract and property regimes are the most accommodating.
Business associations follow closely behind. Special districts' ability to
accommodate the parties' needs depends on the parameters of the legislation
creating them.
163. CAROL R. GOFORTH, NAT'L AGRIC. LAW CTR., Part I: An Overview of
Organizational and Ownership Options Available to Agricultural Enterprises
(2002), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/goforth ownershipl.pdf; CAROL
R. GOFORTH, NAT'L AGRIC. LAW CTR., Part II: An Overview of Organizational
and Ownership Options Available to Agricultural Enterprises (2002), available at
http://www.nationalazlawcenter.ore/assets/articles/goforth ownership2.pdf;
Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate Farming Measures in a Post-Jones World, 14
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97 (2009) (discussing entity-ownership restrictions in
agriculture and evaluating them under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
164. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 31-34 (2009).
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fragmentation, but an extended discussion of the suitability of each is
beyond the scope of this article. However, because of its prevalence,
one additional property tool merits attention-the land trust. 165 Land
trusts are similar to common -interest associations because they hold
and administer servitudes -- conservation easements -- on various
tracts of land. 166 The owner of the encumbered property still retains
possessory rights and the underlying fee to the realty, along with the
ability to use the land for agricultural or other permissible uses.1 67
Land trusts, however, would probably not be helpful for nature-
based entrepreneurs. They are typically non-profit organizations-a
part of the environmentalism-as-charity school of conservation.168
Nebraska, for example, qualified non-governmental holders of
conservation easements must be charitable corporations or trusts.1 69
Such an approach is generally ill suited to the sort of development I
address here. Obviously, one driving force behind the effort here is
to increase the profitability of the landowners within the enterprise.
And, in some instances, the association may carry on the profit-
making venture. In the latter arrangement, charitable status is non-
existent. In the former, it is still questionable.
Regardless of the specific legal tool selected, there is a case to be
made for formalizing the arrangement through private law.
Politically, private law may be more feasible than a public-law
approach. Clearly, the goal of environmentally sound and
biologically diverse landscapes can be achieved through
governmental regulation of resource use. However, even though the
165. Airey provides an excellent legal overview of this model. Airey, supra note
158, at 745-822. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law
of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled
Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1078 (1995) (describing the benefits of this "private
magic" and some pitfalls they may encounter).
166. Airey, supra note 158, at 749.
167. Id.
168. Federal tax treatment for donations of the underlying servitudes is also
premised upon this notion of environmental charity. C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income
Tax Aspects of Conservation Easements, 5 WYO. L. REv. 1 (2005); C. Timothy
Lindstrom, Guide to the Tax Aspects of Conservation Easement Contributions, 7
WYO. L. REV. 441 (2007); Airey, supra note 158, at 759-817. To qualify for the
tax break, such easements must also be perpetual, which may stifle
entrepreneurship in this market.
169. Conservation and Preservation Easement Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2,
111-18 (2005).
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goals of such an effort may be laudable, it often encounters
landowner resistance, decrying governmental action as infringing
upon private property rights.170  One upside of the approach
presented here is its grassroots effort at achieving good
environmental outcomes in an economic system that allows
producers to profit from consumer demand for these important
places. In that sense, government does not dictate the result; the
market produces it. This may appeal more to landowners than
regulation.171
It is more difficult to determine whether a formalized private-law
approach is better than an informal arrangement among landowners.
One could argue that these regimes are only likely to exist (let alone
thrive) in communities where a high level of informal control already
exists. Even then, however, the effort at formalization has utility.
First, formalization carries with it enforcement mechanisms that may
be superior to those that exist with informal efforts.172 Second,
formalization requires the parties to think rigorously about the issues
facing the group. The effort at formalizing the group's effort is thus
formative and, hopefully, produces a workable framework within
which the community can better achieve its goals. Finally, a
formalized legal arrangement is probably more likely to garner
governmental recognition and cooperation. That, in turn, may open
up opportunities for better environmental outcomes than are possible
through informal arrangements.
170. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 5, at 91; Press Release, National
Cattlemen's Beef Association, EPA Releases Clean Water Act Jurisdiction
Guidance - NCBA Concerned with Administration's Vast Overreach (Apr. 28,
2011), http://www.beefusa.org/NEWSEPAReleasesCleanWaterActJurisdiction
Guidance4l450.aspx (discussing the private property rights of farmers and ranchers
across the country).
171. This does not mean, however, that the governmental role is absent or
insignificant. The legal regime within which an association operates is, after all,
backed by the state. And this is not to say that a healthy dose of public-private
interaction would not be necessary. As Ruhl and his co-authors argue, private
parties may not be able to come together effectively on their own. RUHL, supra
note 1, at 158-68.
172. See OSTROM, supra note 69, at 100-01 (noting the presence of both informal
and formal mechanisms in long-enduring institutions).
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III. POSSIBLE LEGAL REFORMS
One key benefit of a common-interest community approach is the
ability to utilize existing legal tools. There is no need to wait for
large-scale legislative reforms before embarking on a private-sector
effort. However, the role of the state is not altogether irrelevant. As
Ostrom has concluded in her seventh principle, the long-term success
of collective-action institutions depends in part on the absence of
external government resistance to the institution.173 Under this
principle, users must also have the ability to create long-term tenure
rights in the resource.' 74  These two observations are linked: the
ability to create long-term tenure rights depends in part on the lack of
governmental resistance or, in the best case, on government
recognition and protection of those rights. Thus, one must examine
the level of governmental support for these efforts even though
government is not the primary actor. As is always the case, the line
between public and private is somewhat fleeting.
Two concerns arise here: (1) the law of servitudes and (2) the
history of wildlife regulation in the United States. I address these
concerns and possible legal reforms for each below. Overall,
however, the need for legal reform is far from clear. The United
States has a long history of individual landownership that sanctifies
owners' ability to exclude and to determine how their lands are
used. 75 Thus, if we are simply talking about ordering land uses in
the private sector, then government may not challenge the ability of
ranchers to create long-term entitlements. But given the confluence of
land use, wildlife, and servitude law, concerns exist.
The law of servitudes may need to be reformed to solidify
landowners' ability to create long-term tenure rights.' 76 Generally,
the law of servitudes allows landowners to grant others access rights
for a particular purpose (e.g., hunting or camping) and it enforces
those rights and duties among subsequent owners of the real estate.177
173. OSTROM, supra note 136, at 259.
174. Id.
175. FREYFOGLE, supra note 5, at 102.
176. Obviously, in states where servitude law may pose a problem, alternative
arrangements like special districts or entity ownership should be considered.
177. The law of servitudes is a murky doctrinal area. As applied in this setting,
there are actually various conveyances of interests in property that may or may not
garner judicial enforcement. For a description of the law of servitues and the
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However, concerns arise when a landowner obligates himself and
successive owners to pay funds to a common-interest association,
maintain the property for wildlife habitat, or provide suitable habitat.
Historically, courts have refused to enforce some use restrictions
and affirmative obligations on subsequent owners of the real estate.178
These decisions vary in their doctrinal grounds and policy rationales,
but many courts have been concerned about the threat such
obligations pose to the value and alienability of land as well as to the
free use of land by subsequent owners.1 79 Modern courts have eroded
the doctrines supporting these decisions because of the importance of
servitudes to land development and the benefits they can be used to
create, but judicial reluctance to enforce these sorts of obligations
persist in some states. 8 0
In states where this remains an issue, legislation could override the
judicial rules. One example of a similar override is that concerning
conservation easements-the foundation of the land-trust movement.
Conservation easements faced a level of uncertainty under property
law because of their perpetual duration and courts' characterization
them as threatening the value, alienability, and productive use of
lands.' 8' They were also subject to judicial skepticism because they
were typically held in gross, meaning that they were held by trusts or
entities that owned no land to which the benefit of the easement could
run..182 To avoid these concerns, many states created enabling
legislation, firmly establishing conservation easements as property law
RESTATEMENT's position, see HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 93, at 14-17. For the
RESTATEMENT's treatment of the right to remove game, see its description of
"profits" in § 1.2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (2000).
178. For the common-law problems facing conservation-oriented servitudes, see
Airey, supra note 158, at 752-56. Airey describes one aspect of these problems as
a "negative easement" problem. I think the more likely problem arising with
servitudes in this area is that of affirmative burden. One could, however, classify a
restraint geared at wildlife production as either, depending upon whether or not one
believes conservation is a productive land use.
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. k (2000)
(describing historical blanket constraints on affirmative burdens), § 3.1 cmt. e
(explaining historical approaches).
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 cmt. a (2000) (rejecting
blanket constraints on affirmative burdens and rejecting the theory of indirect
restraints on alienation).
181. Airey, supra note 158, at 753-56.
182. Id.
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tools. 183  There are, however, conditions associated with their use,
including a list of qualifying entities that can hold them, typically
governmental entities and charitable organizations.184
The servitudes that I argue landowners could use to organize
themselves and create a common-interest association do not raise an
in-gross problem (to the extent it still exists in state common law),
need not raise perpetuity concerns, and should be construed as
involving land-use obligations that facilitate development by
enhancing the value, alienability and productive capacity of the lands
they affect. However, if I am wrong, then enabling legislation like
that created for conservation easements could be crafted to deal with
these problems. Significantly, such legislation could contain
conditions identifying what policymakers view as good associations
in this context.
The second problem is the history of governmental control over
wildlife resources.' 8 5  As with servitude law, the history of
governmental wildlife control raises the prospect of challenge by
external governmental authority and poses a risk to landowners'
ability to create long-term tenure rights in wildlife.186 Many states
currently allocate wildlife through permit mechanisms or other sorts
of hunting regulations. 8 7 In Nebraska, for example, the allocation of
large game species like deer is made through a permitting system in
which non-transferrable permits are sold to hunters or distributed to
landowners. Geographic limits on permits are also a common feature
of regulated hunting. For other types of game, like upland birds,
hunting is restricted to a particular number of days and a limit is
placed on the number and sex of the species that each individual
hunter can take.' 8 8 Regardless of the particular approach, game
183. See id. at 756; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-2, 111-18 (2005).
184. Those conditions are currently under reexamination. See L.B. 529, 102nd
Leg. (Neb. 2011) (limiting the duration of such easements to ten years and giving
property taxing jurisdictions the authority to prohibit the creation of such
easements).
185. For a description of this history, see Darren K. Cottriel, Comment, The
Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an
American Tradition? 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1237-45, 1253-56 (1996).
186. OSTROM, supra note 136.
187. See Cottriel, supra note 185, at 1245 & n.58; 163 NEB. ADMIN. CODE Ch. 2
(2008).
188. For information on Nebraska's permitting regime, see NEBRASKA GAME &
PARKS, http://outdoomebraska.ne.gov/hunting.asp.
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utilization is highly regulated, with an underlying belief that game is
public property to which individuals are given access on the
government's terms.89 Given this state of affairs, government may
resist the sort of effort described here.
In some states this regime is changing, with governmental agencies
recognizing that private landowners hold the key to better game
management and hunting opportunities. For instance, in Colorado,
landowners can get transferrable hunting permits that they can sell. 190
This provides them with a financial incentive to manage their lands
for the presence of huntable species.
Further signals of a shift in policy can be found in the recently
enacted Voluntary Public Access and Habitat Incentive Program,191
administered by the Farm Service Agency within the United States
Department of Agriculture.192 A product of the 2008 Farm Bill, this
program provides grant funding to state governments
to encourage owners and operators of privately-held farm,
ranch, and forest land to voluntarily make that land
available for access by the public for wildlife-dependent
recreation, including hunting, fishing, and other compatible
recreation and to improve fish and wildlife habitat on their
land, under programs administered by State or tribal
governments. 193
That grant money, in turn, compensates landowners for granting
public access for nature-based recreation.1 94
189. See, e.g., Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131, 160-61 (S.D. 2006); Stephen P.
Halbrook, The Constitutional Right to Hunt: New Recognition of an Old Liberty in
Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 197, 203 ("Today, hunting is a regulated
sport which promotes wildlife conservation under the public trust doctrine.").
190. Ranching for Wildlife, COLO. Div. OF WILDLIFE, http://wildlife.state.co.us/
Hunting/BigGame/RanchingforWildlife (last visited Jun. 28, 2011).
191. 16 U.S.C. § 3839bb-5 (Supp IV 2010).
192. See Commodity Credit Corporation, Voluntary Public Access and Habitat
Incentive Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,135 (Jul. 8, 2010).
193. Id.
194. News Release, Farm Serv. Agency, USDA, USDA Announces Voluntary
Public Access and Habitat Incentive Program Grants (Oct. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/newsReleases?area=newsroom&subject-landing&to
pic=ner&newstype=newsrel&type=detail&item=nr20101004rel_0503.html
(VPA-HIP funds may be used to provide rental payments and other incentives, such
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Given the need for enhancing wildlife populations and biodiversity
on privately owned lands, the system could be changed to further
decrease the prospect of challenge by external governmental
authorities. One option would be to eliminate all game regulation
within common-interest communities like those described here.
Arguably, things like permitting systems would not be necessary
once landowners within the community have an incentive to manage
game populations for their own benefit and are making allocation
decisions necessary to sustain game populations. Indeed, we do not
require a permit to slaughter a certain number of cattle. The same
approach could be used here.
However, scrapping permit systems for game hunting would
dramatically change American wildlife law. American law is replete
with laws regulating hunting, including hunting on private
property.195 Game management can take a variety of forms, but
landowners are seldom granted absolute discretion to hunt or allow
others to hunt a particular species.196 Perhaps the only examples of
such an unregulated approach are those species that are regarded as
pests or those that a landowner concludes are damaging his or her
property.197
Indeed, it may not be good policy to eliminate the state's wildlife
management role. For example, state-level data collection and
management can be used to control external impacts for game that
travel beyond the common-interest community's boundary, as well as
ensure that non-participants do not harm the resource system.
Moreover, as in the cattle industry, there may be public-health issues
associated with wildlife management that necessitate state
involvement.198 Many states have also developed the knowledge and
facilities necessary to make management decisions.
as technical or conservation services to landowners who, in return, provide the
public access to their land).
195. See Comment, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century, supra note
185 at 1237-45, 1253-56.
196. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
197. See Hunting Licenses and Permits, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE,
http://www.tpwd. state.tx.us/publications/annual/general/hunt licenses (last visited
Jun. 28, 2011) (explaining that no hunting license is required to hunt attacking
coyotes, depredating feral hogs, or depredating fur-bearing animals).
198. Brucella in elk and bison is an example of a (debatable) concern that has
been regulated. See Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The
Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 33-34, n.178 (1999);
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Given the history and utility of state involvement, it may be more
efficient to preserve the state's wildlife-management role. This could
be done in a number of ways. Common-interest communities could
be required to submit wildlife management plans to a state agency for
its approval. The state could also continue to allocate use rights
through a permitting system. It would determine the overall numbers
of species that can be harvested within the common-interest
community's boundaries and the association could then further
allocate the resource among its members. In conjunction with such
an allocation, a limited number of transferrable permits could be
issued to the association or to the landowners within the association.
The transferrable permit could then be sold in conjunction with the
association's or landowner's operation. State allocations to
associations, perhaps in conjunction with a set of standards the
association would need to meet to qualify for the issuance, would
also provide a strong incentive to form these groups.
State involvement would also acknowledge government support
and allay participant concerns about governmental challenges. 199
Such a governmental commitment would also stabilize the
association's long-term tenure rights in the resources and lessen the
threat of governmental interference with their operations. Thus,
providing a role for public wildlife agencies in the development of
these institutions may benefit landowners, as well as the public.
Finally, changes to our agricultural and conservation policy could
facilitate the emergence of these businesses. The "if it pays, it stays"
hypothesis offered above is clearly far too simple to support the
widespread emergence of nature-based businesses. More difficult
questions will arise concerning the level of return and production
costs. As I have mentioned, scale efficiencies may emerge with
collaboration. And with a high enough level of return, production
costs may be low enough to generate profits. But they may not. And
Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 22-26 (1993).
In this context, the additional prospect of landowners focusing on certain
species and species' traits provides a further level of concern if biodiversity
conservation is a policy goal. There is no assurance that consumers will demand
good biodiversity. And this is one way of alleviating that concern.
199. The political support of public wildlife managers has been an important
ingredient in the emergence of these institutions in countries like Namibia.
Odendaal & Shaw, supra note 3, at 31-32.
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the problem of transformation costs looms large in cooperative
institutional efforts. 200
There are, however, ways of dealing with these problems if they
emerge. Indeed, we have a long history of providing cost-share
assistance to agricultural producers for practices that generate
insufficient income to justify the investment.201 Making up that
shortfall is similar to making up income shortfalls in this area, and
programs can be created to do it.202 A similar existing program is the
Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP), which provides cost-
share and technical assistance "for the development of wildlife
habitat on private agricultural land, nonindustrial private forest land,
and tribal land." 20 3 Programs like this could be expanded and funded
at higher levels as income-assistance measures.
Public programs like this might be more appealing from a fiscal
perspective if producers did not need on-going income support, but
rather needed only "seed money" to establish practices and facilities
that will generate sufficient on-farm returns over the longer term. If
that were the case, then replacing the old Conservation Title
programs204 that fund ongoing shortfalls with seed-money programs
would be fiscally appealing. And even if seed-money programs were
not possible, adjusting the Conservation Title programs to facilitate
nature-based entrepreneurship could reduce the level of income
support producers need,, driving down the costs of the program or
expanding the program's reach.
Some emerging programs in addition to the WHIP are starting to
provide support for nature-based entrepreneurship. The newly created
Cooperative Conservation Partnerships Initiative, 205 administered by
200. OSTROM, supra note 69, at 198-202.
201. See, e.g., Environmental Quality Incentives Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3839aa-
3839aa-9 (Supp. IV 2010).
202. Whether we would want to do it as a matter of policy is a difficult question.
Such payments perhaps should not support practices for which the costs outweigh
the benefits. However, to say that costs outweigh benefits for an individual
producer may mean simply that a portion of the benefits inure to the public. If that
is the case, then the public ought to pay.
203. Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program, 16 U.S.C. § 3839bb-1(a) (Supp. IV
2010).
204. Conservation Title programs are those that are created in the Conservation
Title of the Farm Bill. See, e.g., Title 11: Conservation, Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).
205. 16 U.S.C. § 3843 (Supp. IV 2010).
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the Natural Resources Conservation Service ("NRCS") within the
United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), is an example of
federal funding that may work well in this area. 206 The program,
created by the 2008 Farm Bill, allows for the NRCS to partner with
"producer associations" 207 to deliver program funds to individual
producers for conservation practices and improvements.208 A
common-interest community like that described here may qualify as a
producer association and may be eligible to partner with the NRCS to
support federal funding for producers' efforts.
The development of information and technologies is another feat
the public has undertaken through USDA's vast reach and, quite
significantly, through the land grant complex of universities scattered
throughout the United States. The sciences of grassland
management, wildlife biology, and ecology could be placed on par
with the crop sciences and agronomy. Indeed, if conservation is as
significant as agricultural production, a concerted effort at supporting
the development of this sector of the economy seems entirely
justifiable.209
CONCLUSION
The need for nature-based entrepreneurship is no less important to
the local-food movement than it is to our current agricultural system.
Nature-based entrepreneurship can serve as a diversification strategy
206. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., USDA, Cooperative Conservation
Partnership Initiative, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/ccpi (last visited Jun.
28, 2011).
207. 16 U.S.C. § 3843(d) (Supp. IV 2010).
208. Commodity Credit Corporation, Cooperative Conservation Partnership
Initiative, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,472 (Apr. 12, 2010).
209. Indeed there are some who regard the land grant system as a complete
failure.
(I]n general, it can no longer be denied that the system as a whole has
failed. One hundred and twenty-four years after the Morill Act, ninety-
nine years after the Hatch Act, seventy-two years after the Smith-Lever
Act, the 'industrial classes' are not liberally educated, agriculture and rural
life are not sound or prosperous or permanent, and there is no equitable
balance between agriculture and other segments of the economy.
Anybody's statistics on the reduction of the farm population, on the decay
of rural communities, on soil erosion, soil and water pollution, water
shortages, and farm bankruptcies tell indisputably a story of failure.
BERRY, supra note 17, at 40.
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for local-food producers and, if new lands are enlisted in the effort, it
will help to avoid the loss of some ecological services to food
production. Moreover, the communitarian thinking that may emerge
within foodsheds may foster the emergence of these enterprises.
As these enterprises emerge, lawyers should be ready with
solutions to meet these clients' needs. The common-interest
community may be a good way of establishing collective nature-
based entrepreneurial efforts in areas where and fragmentation
inhibits resource development and use. These communities can
provide participants with the benefits of geographically larger
operations without purchasing additional land. Such communities
can provide members with a governance mechanism for making
provisioning and allocation decisions in an adaptive context, a
revenue device for spreading the costs of management practices or
improvements among the participants, and the opportunity to
generate income from utilizing jointly created resources.
Participants will face many challenges in designing such an
institution, but these challenges are not insurmountable for motivated
producers who see value in providing nature-based opportunities to
consumers. If successful, their lands may become more multi-
functional and more profitable, 2 10 providing not only food, but also
providing a broad array of other products and experiences to
consumers.
210. Claims of profitability legitimately may be met with skepticism when
existing enterprises cannot be found.. However, these enterprises are quite
common in certain parts of the world and examples can be found in the United
States. In future work, I intend to use these enterprises to inform the claims I have
made here.
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